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THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION
AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS IN FEDERAL
RULEMAKING
Curtis W. Copeland*

INTRODUCTION
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is one of
several statutory offices within the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), 1 and can play a significant—if not determinative—role in the
rulemaking process for most federal agencies. In addition to its many other
responsibilities, OIRA reviews the substance of about 600 to 700
significant proposed and final rules each year before agencies publish them
in the Federal Register, 2 and can clear the rules with or without change,
return them to the agencies for “reconsideration,” or encourage the
agencies to withdraw the rules. About 100 of the rules that OIRA reviews
each year are each considered “economically significant” or “major” (e.g.,
expected to have a $100 million impact on the economy). 3 OIRA was
created by Congress and has a number of specific statutory responsibilities,
but also helps ensure that agencies’ rules reflect the president’s policies and

* The author is a Specialist in American National Government at the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) within the Library of Congress. This paper represents his views
and not necessarily those of CRS or the Library. The author would like to thank those who
reviewed earlier drafts of this Article, including Mort Rosenberg, Harold Relyea, and
Clinton Brass of CRS, and Timothy Bober of the Government Accountability Office.
1. The other statutory offices, which are sometimes collectively referred to as the
“management” side of Office of Management and Budget (OMB), are the Office of Federal
Financial Management, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, and the Office of
Electronic Government and Information Technology. OMB’s resource management offices
(RMOs) review agencies’ budget submissions, and are sometimes collectively referred to as
OMB’s “budget” side. However, the RMOs also include management issues in their budget
reviews, and do other “management” work as well.
2. The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000), generally
requires agencies to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, permit
the public to comment on the proposed rule, and then publish a final rule addressing the
comments provided.
3. To view the economically significant rules that OIRA reviews each year, in total or
for particular agencies, see http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
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priorities.
OIRA’s role in the federal rulemaking process has been highly
controversial in all four of the presidential administrations in which it has
been in existence, but the criticisms directed at the office have varied over
time. In some administrations, OIRA has been accused of controlling the
agenda of the rulemaking agencies too much, directing them to change
substantive provisions in draft rules, or even stopping proposed regulatory
actions that it believes are poorly crafted or unnecessary. 4 At other times,
though, OIRA has been accused of exerting inadequate authority over the
agencies’ rules. 5 Other, more persistent criticisms have focused on the lack
of transparency of OIRA’s regulatory reviews to the public and the
sometimes-unseen influence that regulated entities and other nongovernmental organizations can have on agencies’ rules through those
reviews. 6
This Article describes the process OIRA uses to review covered
agencies’ draft rules, OIRA’s effects on the rules, and changes in OIRA’s
procedures and policies in recent years. Much of this discussion is drawn
from a September 2003 report on OIRA that I helped develop when I was
with the General Accounting Office (GAO, now the Government
Accountability Office). 7 First, though, this Article provides a brief history
of presidential regulatory review and describes how OIRA’s review process
was established. Finally, the Article describes several potential legislative
issues regarding OIRA’s regulatory review authority, and makes a few
concluding observations both about OIRA’s recent initiatives and its future.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGULATORY REVIEW IN OIRA
OIRA was created within OMB by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
of 1980. 8 The PRA provided that OIRA would be headed by an
administrator who was designated the “principal advisor to the Director on

4. See, e.g., GEORGE C. EADS & MICHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFORM? REAGAN’S
REGULATORY DILEMMA 135-38 (1984).
5. JAMES L. GATTUSO, THE HERITAGE FOUND., EXEC. MEMO. NO. 813, REGULATING THE
REGULATORS 2 (2002) (noting that “OIRA became a much less aggressive watchdog than it
had been under previous Presidents,” and citing as evidence the decline in the number of
rules returned to the agencies).
6. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN
REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 54
(2003) [hereinafter GAO, RULEMAKING].
7. Id.
8. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980, 44 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1980) (amended
1995).
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Federal information policy.” 9 The Act also provided that the director of
OMB “shall delegate to the [OIRA] Administrator the authority to
Specific areas of
administer all functions under this chapter.” 10
responsibility in the PRA that were assigned to the director, and later
delegated to OIRA, included information policy, information collection
request clearance and paperwork control, statistical policy and
coordination, records management, privacy, and automatic data processing
and telecommunications.11 With regard to paperwork reduction, the Act
generally prohibited agencies from conducting or sponsoring a collection of
information until they had submitted their proposed information collection
requests to OIRA and the office had approved those requests.
The PRA’s requirements cover rules issued by virtually all agencies,
including Cabinet departments, independent agencies, and independent
regulatory agencies and commissions.12
Although the PRA gave OIRA substantive responsibilities in many
areas, the bulk of the office’s day-to-day activities under the act were
initially focused on reviewing and approving agencies’ proposed
information collection requests. OIRA had ninety staff members when the
PRA took effect in 1981, about half of whom were involved in reviewing
agencies’ information collection requests. 13 That year, OIRA took nearly
5,000 paperwork review actions—approving new and revised collections,
extending existing collections, and reinstating expired collections. The
office’s paperwork clearance workload since then has generally been
between 4,000 and 6,000 actions each year, although the number of OIRA
staff overall, and those reviewing proposed collections, has declined
substantially. 14 Although many federal regulations have an information
collection component, the PRA did not authorize OIRA to review or

9. Id. § 3503(b).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 3504. The PRA was later amended in 1986, and again in 1995, and the list of
OIRA’s duties changed somewhat. For example, the 1986 amendments sharpened the
management focus of the act and changed the term “information policy” to “information
resources management.” Paperwork Reduction Act of 1986, 44 U.S.C. § 3501(3) (1986)
(amended 1995). The 1986 amendment also required the administrator of OIRA to be
appointed by the President, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. § 3503(2).
12. As used in this Article, the term “independent regulatory agencies” refers to
agencies established to be independent of the President, including the Federal
Communications Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. The term “independent agencies” refers to agencies that are
independent of Cabinet departments, but not independent regulatory agencies, including the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Office of Personnel Management.
13. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 60.
14. Id.
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comment on the substance of those regulations, or on regulations without
an information collection component. 15
OIRA AND THE REAGAN EXECUTIVE ORDERS ON REGULATORY
REVIEW
In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President on a platform critical of
government’s role in society in general, and of federal regulations in
particular. 16 Shortly after taking office, he established a “Presidential Task
Force on Regulatory Relief,” headed by Vice President George H. W.
Bush, and composed of Cabinet officers (although the bulk of the task
force’s work was reportedly performed by OMB staff). The task force’s
responsibilities included: (1) monitoring the establishment of OMB’s
responsibility to coordinate and review new rules, (2) the development of
legislative changes to regulatory statutes, and (3) the revision of existing
regulations. 17 With respect to this last responsibility, the task force
ultimately identified a total of 119 rules for alteration or cancellation by the
issuing agencies, nearly half of which had been issued by the Department
of Transportation (DOT) or the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). 18 Although the task force found that the implementation of
recommended changes would save more than $150 billion over the next ten
years, critics charged that this estimate ignored the benefits associated with
the rules on what they referred to as the administration’s regulatory “hit
list.” 19 The task force’s legislative efforts were less successful, and failed
to prompt Congress to enact revisions to clean air and water laws, or to
enact broad regulatory reform legislation that would have limited agencies’
rulemaking powers. 20
In February 1981—less than one month after taking office—President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which greatly increased both the

15. In some cases, though, the paperwork requirement may be the essence of the
regulation. For example, EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) program is essentially a
database of information that is collected from the businesses that are required to provide it,
which serves the purpose of making members of the public aware of chemical hazards in
their communities. For more information on the TRI program, see U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Toxics Release Inventory Program, http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
16. See EADS & FIX, supra note 4, at 1-2.
17. Letter from Vice President George Bush, transmitting report on the status of the
Reagan Administration’s regulatory relief efforts (Aug. 11, 1983) (on file with author).
18. See PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON REGULATORY RELIEF, REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
REGULATORY ACHIEVEMENTS (1983).
19. Id.
20. The task force was disbanded in August 1983 after issuing its final report.
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scope and importance of OIRA’s responsibilities. 21 The executive order
generally required covered agencies (Cabinet departments and independent
agencies, but not independent regulatory agencies) to:
• Refrain from taking regulatory action “unless the potential benefits to
society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society,” to select
regulatory objectives to maximize net benefits to society, and to select the
regulatory alternative that involves the lowest net cost to society; 22
• Prepare a “regulatory impact analysis” for each “major” rule, 23 which
was defined as any regulation likely to result in (among other things) an
annual effect on the economy of $100 million.24 Those analyses were
required to contain a description of the potential benefits and costs of the
rule, a description of alternative approaches that could achieve the
regulatory goal at lower cost (and a list of reasons why they were not
selected), and a determination of the net benefits of the rule. 25 The issuing
agency was to make the initial determination of whether a rule was
“major,” but the executive order gave OMB the authority to require a rule
to be considered major; 26 and
• Send a copy of each draft proposed and final rule to OMB before
publication in the Federal Register. 27 The order authorized OMB to
review “any preliminary or final regulatory impact analysis, notice of
proposed rulemaking, or final rule based on the requirements of this
Order.” 28 Non-major rules were required to be submitted to OMB at least
ten days before publication, but major rules had to be submitted as much as
sixty days in advance. 29
Executive Order 12,291 indicated that OMB’s review of rules and
impact analyses should be completed within sixty days, but it allowed the
director to extend that period whenever necessary. 30 It also authorized the
director to exempt classes of regulations from any or all of the order’s
requirements, and generally required agencies to “refrain” from publishing

21. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981). For a description of
the effects of this order, see Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management
& Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive
Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 1, 80 (1984).
22. Exec. Order No. 12,291, supra note 21, § 2(a)-(e).
23. Id. § 3(a).
24. Id. § 1(b).
25. Id. §§ 3(d)(1)-(5).
26. Id. § 3(b).
27. Id. § 3(c).
28
Id. § 3(e)(1).
29. Id. § 3(c)(1)-(3).
30. Id. § 8.
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any final rules until they had responded to OMB’s comments. 31 The
executive order made OMB’s authority to review agencies’ draft rules
subject to the overall direction of the presidential task force on regulatory
relief. 32
Although the Executive Order did not specifically mention OIRA,
shortly after it was issued the Reagan Administration decided to integrate
OMB’s regulatory review responsibilities under the executive order with
the responsibilities given to OMB (and ultimately to OIRA) by the PRA. 33
As a result, OIRA’s responsibilities for substantive review of rules under
the executive order were added to the office’s substantial responsibilities
under the PRA. In 1981, OIRA reviewed the substance of nearly 2,800
rules under Executive Order 12,291—in addition to the nearly 5,000
paperwork review actions it took that year.34
In 1985, President Reagan extended OIRA’s influence over rulemaking
even further by issuing Executive Order 12,498, which required Cabinet
departments and independent agencies (but not independent regulatory
agencies) to submit a “regulatory program” to OMB for review each year
that covered all of their significant regulatory actions that were underway
or planned. 35 Previously, Executive Order 12,291 had required each of
those agencies to publish semiannual “regulatory agendas” of proposed
regulations that the agency “has issued or expects to issue,” and any
existing rule that was under review.36 These agendas were required to
contain a schedule for completing action on any major rule for which the
agency had published a notice of proposed rulemaking. The new executive
order went further, providing that, except in “unusual circumstances,”
OMB could return any rule submitted for review under Executive Order
31. See id. The exemptions that OMB was authorized to grant fell into four broad
categories: (1) rules that were essentially non-regulatory in nature; (2) rules that delegated
regulatory authority to the States; (3) rules that generally affected individual entities and that
did not involve broader policy issues; and (4) rules for which a delay of even a few days
could have imposed substantial costs and that were unlikely to involve significant policy
issues. Id. OMB granted about thirty exemptions, most of which were established in 1981
or 1982.
32. Id. § 3(e)(1). Although Vice President Bush chaired the task force, the administrator
of OIRA served as its executive director. Other members of the task force included the
Director of OMB, the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Commerce, Labor, and the
Treasury.
33. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET: EVOLVING ROLES
AND FUTURE ISSUES 201-10 (1986) [hereinafter CRS, EVOLVING ROLES].
34. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-89-101FS REGULATORY REVIEW:
INFORMATION ON OMB’S REVIEW PROCESS 14 (1989).
35. Exec. Order No. 12,498, 50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 8, 1985).
36. President Carter first required the use of these agendas in 1978. See Exec. Order
No. 12,291, supra note 21, § 5.
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12,291 to the issuing agency for “reconsideration” if it was not in the
agency’s regulatory program for that year, or was “materially different”
from what was described in the program. 37 In other words, OIRA could
return a draft rule to an issuing agency if the office did not have advance
notice of the rule’s submission, even if the rule was otherwise consistent
with the requirements in Executive Order 12,291.38 The regulatory agenda
and program requirements in these executive orders also permitted OIRA
to become aware of forthcoming agency actions well in advance of the
submission of a draft proposed rule, thereby permitting the office to stop or
alter an objectionable rule before the rulemaking process developed
momentum. Although Reagan Administration officials compared this
planning process to the process used to develop the President’s budget,
critics noted that the budget process has a final step that the regulatory
process lacked—review and approval by Congress. 39 Therefore, they
argued, the insertion of OIRA into the regulatory planning process
represented a further aggregation of at least potential policymaking power
in the hands of the OIRA Administrator and, more generally, the Executive
Office of the President. 40
COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS REGULATORY REVIEW EFFORTS
The establishment of a broad regulatory review function within OIRA by
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 was a significant development both in
the office’s history and in the overall movement to reform the federal
regulatory process. In another sense, though, these executive orders
represented the continuation of the presidential review of rules, not the
starting point thereof. Some form of centralized review of agencies’
regulations within the Executive Office of the President has been part of
the rulemaking process since the early 1970s. For example:
• In 1971, President Nixon established a “Quality of Life Review”
program in which executive departments and independent agencies
submitted all “significant” draft proposed and final rules pertaining to
“environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public
health and safety” to OMB, which then circulated them to other agencies

37. Exec. Order No. 12,498, supra note 35, §§ 3(d).
38. An OIRA representative said that the office had never used this authority, noting
that it would have been difficult to defend the return of an agency’s rule for purely
procedural reasons. Interview with OIRA representative, in Old Executive Office Building,
Washington, D.C. (2003) (on file with author) (part of a series of interviews with various
representatives from OIRA as research for GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6).
39. CRS, EVOLVING ROLES, supra note 33, at 201-04.
40. Id.
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for comment. 41 In their submissions, agencies were to provide a summary
of their proposals, including their principal objectives, the alternatives that
they considered, and a comparison of the expected benefits and cost of
those alternatives. Agencies were also required to submit a schedule
showing estimated dates of proposed and final significant rules. 42
• In 1974, President Ford issued Executive Order 11,821, which required
agencies to prepare an “inflation impact statement” for each “major”
proposed rule. 43 The statement was a certification that the inflationary
impact of the rule had been evaluated in accordance with criteria and
procedures developed by OMB. The executive order directed OMB to
develop criteria for the identification of major rules that may have a
significant impact on inflation, but specified that the office must consider
costs, effects on productivity, effects on competition, and effects on the
supply of important products and services. Before a major rule was
published in the Federal Register, the issuing agency was required to
submit the associated impact statement to the Council on Wage and Price
Stability (CWPS). CWPS would then either provide comments directly to
the agency or participate in the regular rulemaking comment process.
• In 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order 12,044, which
(among other things) required agencies to publish semiannual agendas of
any significant rules under development or review, and to prepare a
regulatory analysis for all rules that have a more than $100 million impact
on the economy. 44 The analysis was to contain a succinct statement of the
problem, a description of the alternative approaches considered, and the
“economic consequences” of those alternatives. 45 OMB was instructed to
“assure the effective implementation of this Order,” but was not given
specific review responsibilities.46 President Carter also established (1) a
“Regulatory Analysis Review Group” (RARG) to review the analyses
prepared for certain major rules, and to submit comments during the
comment period; and (2) a “Regulatory Council” to coordinate agencies’
actions to avoid conflicting requirements and duplication of effort.47
In several ways, though, the analytical and review requirements in
41. This requirement was formally established in October 1971. According to some
observers, the requirements were routinely imposed only on EPA. Memorandum from
George Schultz, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget (Oct. 1971), available at
http://thecred.com/ombpapers/qualityoflife.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
42. Id.
43. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (Nov. 29, 1974).
44. Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, § 3(a)(1) (Mar. 24, 1978).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Executive Order 12,291 were significantly different from these previous
efforts. For example, the requirement in the new executive order that
agencies choose the least costly approach to a particular regulatory
objective went further than the requirement in President Carter’s Executive
Order 12,044, which simply required agencies to analyze and consider
alternative regulatory approaches. Also, whereas the regulatory oversight
functions were divided among many offices (OMB, CWPS, RARG, and the
regulatory council) during the Carter Administration, Executive Order
12,291 consolidated these functions within OIRA. 48
Another major difference was the amount of influence that OIRA had
compared to its predecessors. Under previous executive orders, CWPS and
RARG primarily had advisory roles. In contrast, under Executive Order
12,291, OIRA could overrule agency determinations regarding whether the
rule was “major” (and therefore required a regulatory impact analysis), and
could delay the regulation at either the proposed or final rulemaking stage
until the agency had adequately responded to its concerns (e.g., if it
believed the agency had not considered all reasonable alternatives, or that
the agency’s analysis was unsound, or contrary to the administration’s
policy viewpoint). 49 OIRA’s significant influence on rulemaking was
underscored by its organizational position within OMB, the agency that
reviews and approves the rulemaking agencies’ budget requests on behalf
of the President. Finally, the nature and transparency of the review process
was significantly different under Executive Order 12,291. Under the Carter
Administration’s approach, RARG and CWPS prepared and filed
comments on agency proposals during the formal public comment period.
In the case of RARG filings, a draft of the comments was circulated to all
RARG members, and the comments, along with any dissents, were placed
on the public record at the close of the comment period. In contrast,
OIRA’s reviews occurred before the rules were published for comment,
and Executive Order 12,291 did not require that OIRA’s comments on the
draft rule be disclosed.
EARLY VIEWS REGARDING OIRA REVIEWS
The expansion of OIRA’s authority in the rulemaking process via
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 was highly controversial. Although
some believed that OIRA’s authority did not go far enough (e.g., the review
requirements did not cover independent regulatory agencies), most of the

48. George Eads, Harnessing Regulation: The Evolving Role of White House Oversight,
5 REGULATION 19, 26 (1981).
49. Executive Order No. 12,291, supra note 21, §§ 3(b), 3(f).
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concerns were that the expansion had gone too far. For example, a number
of the concerns raised by members of Congress, public interest groups, and
others focused on whether OIRA’s role violated the constitutional
separation of powers, and on the effect that OIRA’s review process had on
public participation and the timeliness of agencies’ rules. 50 Some believed
that OIRA’s new authority displaced the discretionary authority of agency
decision makers in violation of congressional delegations of rulemaking
authority, and that the President exceeded his authority in issuing the
executive orders. 51 Others indicated that OIRA did not have the technical
expertise needed to instruct agencies about the content of their rules. 52 Still
other concerns focused on OIRA’s ability to carry out its many
responsibilities. In 1983, GAO concluded that the expansion of OIRA’s
responsibilities under Executive Order 12,291 had adversely affected the
office’s ability to carry out its PRA responsibilities, and recommended that
Congress consider amending the act to prohibit OIRA from carrying out
other responsibilities like regulatory review.53
Other concerns about OIRA focused on the lack of transparency of the
regulatory reviews, and specifically questioned whether OIRA had become
a clandestine conduit for outside influence in the rulemaking process.
Critics pointed out that, in the first few months after the executive order
was issued, OIRA met with representatives from dozens of businesses and
associations seeking regulatory relief and returned dozens of rules to the
agencies for reconsideration. 54 In response to these concerns, the OMB
Director issued a memorandum in June 1981 stating that any factual
material provided to OIRA regarding proposed rules should also be sent to
the relevant rulemaking agency. 55 This requirement did not, however,
50. Role of OMB in Regulation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. (1981). See also
Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of Agency
Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 193-247 (1981).
51. For a discussion of this argument, see Olson, supra note 21, at 17-27.
52. Others, however, argued that OIRA provided expertise in the regulatory process, and
could offer a wider range of options. See BARRY D. FRIEDMAN, REGULATION IN THE
REAGAN-BUSH ERA: THE ERUPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE 54-55 (1995).
53. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-83-35, IMPLEMENTING THE PAPERWORK
REDUCTION ACT: SOME PROGRESS, BUT MANY PROBLEMS REMAIN 9 (1983).
54. See Letter from James C. Miller III, Administrator of OIRA, to the Honorable John
D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce (Apr. 28, 1981), available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Dingell.pdf (last visited
May 12, 2006).
55. Role of OMB in Regulation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 97th Cong. 46 (1981) (statement of
James C. Miller III, OIRA Administrator, characterizing OMB Director Stockman’s
memorandum), available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/Reagan61881.PDF.
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apply to information provided to OIRA orally, and did not require that
OIRA’s meetings with outside parties be disclosed to the public.
OIRA’s role in the rulemaking process remained controversial for the
next several years. In 1983, Congress was so dissatisfied with OIRA’s
performance in the areas of regulatory and paperwork review that it
permitted the office’s appropriation authority to expire (although the
office’s statutory authority under the PRA was not affected and it continued
to receive an appropriation via OMB).56 In 1985, five House Committee
chairmen filed an amicus brief in a lawsuit brought against the Department
of Labor (DOL) regarding the DOL’s decision (reportedly at the behest of
OMB) not to pursue a proposed standard concerning exposure to ethylene
oxide, a sterilizing chemical widely used in hospitals and suspected of
causing cancer. The chairmen claimed that OMB’s actions represented a
usurpation of congressional authority. 57
Congress reauthorized OIRA in 1986, but only after making the
Administrator subject to Senate confirmation. By 1986, Congress began
considering legislation to restrict OIRA’s regulatory review role and to
block OIRA’s budget request. 58 In June 1986, in an attempt to head off
that legislation, the presiding OIRA Administrator issued a memorandum
to the heads of departments and agencies subject to Executive Order
12,291, describing new procedures to improve the transparency of the
review process. 59 For example, the memorandum said that only the
administrator or the deputy administrator could communicate with outside
parties regarding rules submitted for review, and that OIRA would make
available to the public all written materials received from outside parties.60
OIRA also said that it would, upon written request after a rule had been
published, make available all written correspondence between OIRA and

56. OIRA’s authorization for appropriation also expired in 2001, and has not been
reestablished. See 44 U.S.C. § 3520 (authorizing $8 million for PRA-related activities “and
for no other purpose” in fiscal years 1996 through 2001).
57. Morton Rosenberg, Regulatory Management at OMB, in CRS, EVOLVING ROLES,
supra note
33, at 185, 218 (1986).
58. Id.
59. Memorandum from Wendy L. Gramm, OIRA Administrator, to Heads of Dept’s and
Agencies Subject to Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 on Additional Procedures
Concerning OIRA Reviews Under Executive Order Nos. 12,291 and 12,498 [Revised] (June
13, 1986), reprinted in U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APRIL 1, 1992—MARCH 31, 1993, at 585 (1993).
60. Id. For further information on this policy, see Judith Havemann, No ‘Shade-Drawn’
Dealings for OMB; Congress Gets Disclosure of Regulation-Review Procedures, WASH.
POST, Jun. 17, 1986, at A21.
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the agency head regarding the draft submitted for review. 61
In 1987, the National Academy of Public Administration published a
report on presidential management of agency rulemaking that summarized
the criticisms of the OIRA review process, as well as the positions of its
proponents. 62 The report also described a number of issues in regulatory
review and offered recommendations for improvement. For example, the
report recommended that “regulatory management be accepted as an
essential element of presidential management.” 63 It also recommended that
regulatory agencies “log, summarize, and include in the rulemaking record
all communications from outside parties, OMB, or other executive or
legislative branch officials concerning the merits of proposed
regulations.” 64
In 1988, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
examined the issue of presidential review of agency rulemaking and
concluded that such reviews could improve coordination and resolve
conflicts among agencies.65 ACUS also said, though, that presidential
review “does not displace responsibilities placed in the agency by law nor
authorize the use of factors not otherwise permitted by law.” 66 ACUS
recommended public disclosure of proposed and final agency rules
submitted to OIRA under the executive order, communications from OMB
relating to the substance of rules, and communications with outside parties,
and also recommended that the reviews be completed in a “timely
fashion.” 67
61. Id.
62. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING IN
REGULATORY AGENCIES (1987) [hereinafter NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL
MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING].
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 1 C.F.R. §
305.88-9 (1988), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/acus/305889.html (last
visited May 3, 2006). The Administrative Conference was established in 1968 to provide
advice regarding procedural improvements in federal programs, and was eliminated by
Congress in 1995. See Cindy Skrzycki, Interest Grows in Resurrecting Administrative
Conference, WASH. POST, May 25, 2004, at E01.
66. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, supra note
65.
67. Id. The National Academy of Public Administration and the American Bar
Association (ABA) have also recognized the potential value of presidential regulatory
review, recommending such reforms as improved transparency and better communication
between OIRA and agency staff. See NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., PRESIDENTIAL
MANAGEMENT OF RULEMAKING, supra note 62; see also Letter from William Funk, ChairElect, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Lorraine Hunt, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs (Apr. 24, 2003),
available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/policy_letters/sec_comments_omb.doc (last
visited Apr. 21, 2006) (summarizing the ABA’s previous recommendations).
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OIRA AND THE GEORGE H. W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION
President George H. W. Bush continued the implementation of
Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 during his administration, but external
events significantly affected OIRA’s operation and, more generally, the
federal rulemaking process. In response to published accounts that the
burden of regulation was once again increasing, President Bush established
the President’s “Council on Competitiveness” (also known as the
Competitiveness Council) to review regulations issued by agencies.68
Chaired by Vice President Dan Quayle, the council oversaw and was
supported by OIRA, and reviewed particular rules that it believed would
have a significant impact on the economy or particular industries. The
council signified continued White House-level interest in the regulatory
arena, and also represented a continuation of the type of role played by the
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief during the Reagan
Administration. 69
Many of the Competitiveness Council’s actions were highly
controversial, with critics assailing both the effects of those actions (e.g.,
rolling back environmental or other requirements) and the fact that the
council acted in secret.70 The council attempted to maintain strict secrecy
regarding both its deliberations and the identity of those in the private
sector with whom it communicated or consulted.71 Critics decried what
they believed to be “backdoor rulemaking” by the Competitiveness
Council, but the council continued its operations until the end of the Bush
Administration in 1993. 72 Meanwhile, OIRA continued its operations
under Executive Order 12,291, reviewing between 2,100 and 2,600
proposed and final rules each year from 1989 through 1992. 73

68. The Competitiveness Council was reportedly created in April 1989 when the Vice
President issued a press release, causing some to question its legitimacy. See Caroline
DeWitt, The President’s Council on Competitiveness: Undermining the Administrative
Procedure Act with Regulatory Review, 6 ADMIN. L. REV. 759, 800 (1993).
69. Id.
70. See CHRISTINE TRIANO & NANCY WATZMAN, OMB WATCH/PUB. CITIZEN, ALL THE
VICE PRESIDENT’S MEN: HOW THE QUAYLE COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS SECRETLY
UNDERMINES HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS (1991).
71. See Bob Woodward & David Broder, Quayle’s Quest: Curb Rules, Leave ‘No
Fingerprints,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1992, at A1.
72. For example, Representative Henry Waxman reportedly considered the Council a
“shadow government.” See FRIEDMAN, supra note 52, at 166.
73. For the number of OMB reviews conducted each year, see
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init (last visited May 12,
2006). The number of OIRA reviews is graphically depicted in GAO, RULEMAKING, supra
note 6, at 24.
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REGULATORY REVIEW UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866
In September 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 on
“Regulatory Planning and Review,” which revoked Executive Orders
12,291 and 12,498, and abolished the Council on Competitiveness.74
Although different from its predecessors in many respects, Executive Order
12,866 (which is still in effect) continued the general framework of
presidential review of rulemaking. For example, it requires covered
agencies (again, Cabinet departments and independent agencies, but not
independent regulatory agencies) to submit their proposed and final rules to
OMB before publishing them in the Federal Register. 75 The order also
requires agencies to prepare cost-benefit analyses for their “economically
significant” rules (which are essentially the same as “major” rules under
Executive Order 12,291). 76 As discussed in detail below, however,
Executive Order 12,866 established a somewhat new regulatory philosophy
and a new set of rulemaking principles, limited OIRA’s reviews to certain
types of rules, and also put new transparency requirements in place.
Section 2(b) of the order assigns responsibility for review of agency
rulemaking to OMB, and specifically names OIRA “the repository of
expertise concerning regulatory issues.” 77 The order also names the Vice
President the principal advisor to the President on regulatory policy,
planning, and review. 78
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS IN THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
In its statement of regulatory philosophy, Executive Order 12,866 says,
among other things, that agencies should assess all costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives, including both quantitative and qualitative
measures. 79 It also provides that agencies should select regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits (unless a statute requires another
approach). 80 Where permissible and applicable, the order states that
agencies should adhere to a set of principles when developing rules,

74. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo12866.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
75. Id. at 51,741.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 51,737.
78. Id. Executive Order 13,258, issued in February 2002, amended Executive Order
12,866 and reassigned all roles originally assigned to the Vice President to the President’s
chief of staff. See Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo13258.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
79. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, at 51,735.
80. Id.
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including: (1) consideration of the degree and nature of risk posed when
setting regulatory priorities, (2) adoption of regulations only upon a
“reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify
its costs,” and (3) tailoring regulations to impose the least burden on
society needed to achieve the regulatory objectives.81 Some of the stated
objectives of the order are “to reaffirm the primacy of Federal agencies in
the regulatory decision-making process; to restore the integrity and
legitimacy of regulatory review and oversight; and to make the process
more accessible and open to the public.” 82 This reference to the “primacy
of Federal agencies” signaled a significant change in regulatory
philosophy, vesting greater control of the rulemaking process with
regulatory agencies and taking away authority from OIRA. Further, the
requirement that the benefits of a regulation “justify” its costs is a
noticeably lower threshold than the requirement in Executive Order 12,291
that the benefits “outweigh” the costs.
Section six of Executive Order 12,866 established agency and OIRA
responsibilities in the centralized review of regulations. 83 In contrast to the
broad scope of review under Executive Order 12,291, the new order limited
OIRA reviews to actions identified by the rulemaking agency or OIRA as
“significant” regulatory actions, which are defined in section 2(f) of the
order as the following:
Any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may (1) have an
annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect
in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity,
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local,
or tribal governments or communities; (2) create a serious inconsistency
or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency;
(3) materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees,
or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or (4)
raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the
President’s priorities, or the principles set forth in the Executive order. 84

By focusing OIRA’s reviews on significant rules, the number of draft
proposed and final rules that OIRA examined fell from between 2,000 and
3,000 per year under Executive Order 12,291 to between 500 and about
700 rules per year under Executive Order 12,866.85 Most of the rules no
longer
reviewed
are
“routine
and
frequent”
or

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 51,735-36.
Id.
Id. at 51,740.
Id. at 51,738.
GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 24.
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“informational/administrative” rules, though some have substantive
impacts but fall short of the above definition of “significant.” 86
Executive Order 12,866 also differs from its predecessors in other
respects. For example, the order generally requires that OIRA complete its
review of proposed and final rules within ninety calendar days, and
requires both the agencies and OIRA to disclose certain information about
how the regulatory reviews were conducted. 87 Specifically, agencies are
required to identify for the public (1) the substantive changes made to rules
between the draft submitted to OIRA for review and the action
subsequently announced, and (2) changes made at the suggestion or
recommendation of OIRA. 88 OIRA is required to provide agencies with a
copy of all written communications between OIRA personnel and parties
outside of the executive branch, and a list of the dates and names of
individuals involved in substantive oral communications. 89 The order also
instructs OIRA to maintain a public log of all regulatory actions under
review, and of all of the above-mentioned documents provided to the
agencies. 90
OIRA’S FORMAL REVIEW PROCESS
OIRA reviews agencies’ draft rules at both the proposed and final stages
of rulemaking. 91 In each phase, the review process starts when the
rulemaking agency formally submits a regulatory review package to OIRA
consisting of the rule, any supporting materials, and a transmittal form. 92
The OIRA docket librarian then logs the receipt of the review package and
forwards it to the appropriate desk officer. In some cases, agencies
withdraw their rules from OIRA during the review period and the rules

86. GPO Access, The Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions,
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ua/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). These categories of
rulemaking provide information in a consistent format about regulations that agencies are
considering or reviewing.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. For a discussion of the differences between the transparency requirements under
Executive Order 12,291 and Executive Order 12,866, see William D. Araiza, Judicial and
Legislative Checks on Ex Parte OMB Influence Over Rulemaking, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 611
(2002); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995).
91. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 30. In recent years, thirty-to-forty percent of
OIRA’s reviews have been proposed rules, and fifty-to-sixty percent have been final rules.
OIRA also reviews other rulemaking documents (e.g., pre-rule documents and notices),
accounting for ten-to-fifteen percent of its review actions.
92. Id.
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may or may not be subsequently resubmitted. At the end of the review
period, OIRA either returns the draft rule to the agency “for
reconsideration” or OIRA concludes that the rule is consistent with the
executive order. OIRA codes the rule in its database as “consistent with
change” if there had been any changes to the rule, regardless of the source
or extent of the change. OIRA codes rules in its database as “consistent
with no change” only if they are exactly the same at the end of the review
period as the original submission. If the draft rule is a proposed rule and is
judged by OIRA to be consistent with the requirements in Executive Order
12,866, the agency may then publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in
the Federal Register, obtain comments during the specified comment
period, review the comments received, and make any changes to the rule
that it believes are necessary to respond to those comments (the executive
order says that this comment period should, in most cases, be at least sixty
days for significant rules reviewed by OIRA). 93 If the draft is a final rule,
the agency may publish the rule after OIRA concludes its review and the
rule will generally take effect either at that point or at some later date
specified by the agency.
OUTCOMES OF OIRA’S REVIEWS
As Table 1 indicates, in most of the years since Executive Order 12,866
was issued, more than ninety percent of the rules that OIRA reviewed have
been coded in the database as either “consistent with change” or “consistent
without change.” 94 Only a small percentage of rules were withdrawn, and
even fewer were returned to the agencies. The proportion of rules coded as
“changed” has varied somewhat over time, but the last several years of the
Clinton Administration (1997 through 2000) were fairly similar to the first
non-transition years of the George W. Bush Administration (2002 through
2004).

93. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, §6(a)(1).
94. RegInfo.gov,
Where
to
Find
Federal
Regulatory
Information,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport (last visited May 1, 2006) (providing
annual lists of concluded executive order reviews and statistics on OIRA’s past reviews).
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TABLE 1: MOST RULES THAT OIRA REVIEWS ARE CODED AS
“CHANGED” 95
Year

Number of Percentage of rules OIRA reviewed that were coded:
proposed
Consistent Consistent Withdrawn Returned Other
and
final with change without
rules that
change
OIRA
reviewed

1994

831

37.3

53.4

4.3

0.2

4.9

1995

620

39.0

53.1

5.2

0.5

2.3

1996

507

51.5

41.4

5.1

0.0

2.0

1997

505

56.0

37.4

5.1

0.8

0.6

1998

487

59.3

36.1

3.1

0.0

1.4

1999

587

62.2

31.5

3.1

0.0

3.2

2000

583

60.4

34.3

3.9

0.0

1.4

2001

700

45.6

28.1

22.0

2.6

1.7

2002

669

54.3

31.7

7.6

0.7

5.6

2003

715

60.3

30.3

6.9

0.3

2.2

2004

627

62.7

29.8

6.5

0.2

0.8

2005

610

65.4

27.0

6.6

0.2

1.0

As noted previously, however, in OIRA’s database, “consistent with
change” simply means that the rule changed while it was under formal
review—not that it was necessarily changed as a consequence of OIRA’s
review. If an agency submits a new draft of a rule during this period (even
to correct typographical errors), it is coded in the database as “changed.”
Also, changes that OIRA may suggest outside of the formal review period
are not reflected in these data. For example, if a rule is changed as a
consequence of OIRA suggestions during an “informal” review (discussed
in more detail later), but no changes are made during review, then the rule
would be coded as “consistent with no change.”
The data indicate that there were a relatively large number of rules that
were withdrawn and returned in 2001. The withdrawn rules reflect actions
95. These data are culled from a public database that OMB publishes online. See
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init. To get the numbers for
any year, enter the year (e.g. “01/01/1994” to “12/31/1994”), click the “By OIRA
conclusion action” option, then “search.”
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taken at the start of the George W. Bush Administration pursuant to a
memorandum issued by Assistant to the President and former Chief of Staff
Andrew H. Card, which generally directed Cabinet departments and
independent agencies (1) not to send proposed or final rules to the Office of
the Federal Register, (2) to withdraw from the Office rules that had not yet
been published in the Federal Register, and (3) to postpone for sixty days
the effective date of rules that had been published but had not yet taken
effect. 96 As discussed in greater detail later in this article, OIRA returned a
number of rules to the agencies for reconsideration shortly after a new
administrator was appointed in 2001. 97
The type of review that OIRA conducts under Executive Order 12,866
sometimes depends on the type of draft rule submitted. For example, if the
draft rule contains a collection of information covered by the PRA, the desk
officer would also review it for compliance with that Act. If the draft rule
is “economically significant” (e.g., has an annual impact on the economy of
at least $100 million), the executive order requires agencies to prepare an
economic analysis describing, among other things, the alternatives that the
agency considered and the costs and benefits of those alternatives. 98 For
those economically significant rules, OIRA desk officers are to review the
economic analyses using the office’s guidance on how to prepare
regulatory analyses under the Executive Order.99
An attachment to a September 20, 2001, memorandum to the President’s
Management Council described the general principles and procedures that
OIRA reportedly uses in the implementation of Executive Order 12,866. 100
For example, the attachment indicated that the office would, where
appropriate, (1) include an evaluation of whether the agency has conducted
an adequate risk assessment; (2) give “a measure of deference” to

96. Memorandum from Andrew H. Card to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive
Departments
and
Agencies
(Jan.
20,
2001),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/regreview_plan.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). For
a discussion of the rules with postponed effective dates, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-02-370R, REGULATORY REVIEW: DELAY OF EFFECTIVE DATES OF FINAL RULES
SUBJECT TO THE ADMINISTRATION’S JAN. 20, 2001 MEMORANDUM (2002).
97. See supra notes 136-148.
98. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, at 51,738 (defining an economically
significant rule as adversely affecting “in a material way, the economy, a sector of the
economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State,
local, or tribal governments or communities”).
CIRCULAR
A-4
(2003),
available
at
99. See
OMB,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
100. Memorandum from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to the President’s Mgmt.
Council (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira_reviewprocess.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
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regulatory impact analyses and other supporting technical documents that
have been peer reviewed in accordance with specified procedures; (3)
ensure that regulatory clearance packages satisfy the requirements in other
executive orders (e.g., include the certifications required by Executive
Order 13,132 on “Federalism” and Executive Order 13,175 on
“Consultation and Coordination with Indian and Tribal Governments”); (4)
consult with the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the SBA Chief
Counsel for Advocacy; and (5) ensure that agencies evaluate the possible
impact of the draft rule on the programs of other federal agencies.101
There is usually some type of communication during the review process
(often via e-mail or telephone) between the OIRA desk officer and the
rulemaking agency regarding specific issues in the draft rule. Briefings and
meetings are sometimes held between OIRA and the agency during the
review process, with OIRA branch chiefs, the deputy administrator, or the
administrator involved in some of these meetings. According to OIRA, the
desk officers always consult with the relevant resource management office
on the “budget side” of OMB as part of their reviews, and reviews of draft
rules are not completed until those offices sign off. 102 If the draft rule is
economically significant, the desk officer would also consult with a
government economist to help review the required economic analysis.103
For other rules, the desk officer might consult with other OIRA staff on
issues involving statistics and surveys, information technology and
systems, or privacy issues. 104 In certain cases, OIRA may circulate a draft
rule to other parts of the Executive Office of the President (e.g., the Office
of Science and Technology Policy or the Council on Environmental
Quality) or other agencies (e.g., the Departments of Energy, the Interior, or
Transportation for certain EPA rules).
As noted previously, Executive Order 12,866 requires OIRA to complete
its regulatory reviews within certain timeframes—(1) within ten working
days of submission for any preliminary actions prior to a notice of
proposed rulemaking (e.g., a notice of inquiry or an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking) or (2) within ninety calendar days of submission for
all other regulatory actions (or forty-five days if OIRA had previously
reviewed the material). 105 In some instances, however, agency officials
said OIRA will ask the rulemaking agency to withdraw the rule and

101. Id.
102. Interview with OIRA representatives, in Old Executive Office Building,
Washington, D.C. (2003). See note 38 supra.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Exec. Order 12,866, supra note 74, at 51,739.
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resubmit it, restarting the review period. 106 The Executive Order does not
permit OIRA to “approve” or “disapprove” a draft rule; it is up to the
agency to decide whether to proceed with publication of a rule after it had
been returned, or to accept OIRA’s suggested changes. OIRA
representatives describe this as an iterative process in which the agencies
and OIRA negotiate issues and clarify terms. 107 Nevertheless, agencies
very rarely publish rules that OIRA returns or ignore substantive OIRA
“suggestions.” In some instances, agency officials will formally or
informally appeal OIRA determinations to the White House.
OIRA’S INFORMAL REVIEWS
For some rules, there is an additional phase of “informal review” before
the rule is officially submitted to OIRA. 108 In its December 2001 report on
the costs and benefits of federal regulations, OIRA stated that the office’s
original review process “was designed as an end-of-the-pipeline check
against poorly conceived regulations.” 109 OIRA also said, however, that by
the time an agency formally submits a rule to OIRA for review, there may
be “strong institutional momentum” behind the proposal and, as a result,
the agency may be reluctant to address certain issues that OIRA analysts
might raise. 110 Therefore, OIRA indicated that “there is value in promoting
a role for OIRA’s analytic perspective earlier in the process, before the
agency becomes too entrenched.” 111 OIRA went on to state the following:
A common yet informal practice is for agencies to share preliminary
drafts of rules and/or analyses with OIRA desk officers prior to formal
decision making at the agency. This practice is useful for agencies since
they have the opportunity to educate OIRA desk officers in a more patient
way, before the formal 90-day review clock at OMB begins to tick. The
practice is also useful for OIRA analysts because they have the
opportunity to flag serious problems early enough to facilitate correction
before the agency’s position is irreversible. 112

OIRA cannot informally review each of the hundreds of significant
proposed and final rules that are submitted to the office each year.
106. Interview with OIRA officials, in Old Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C.
(2003). See note 38 supra.
107. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 81.
108. Id. at 30.
109. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: 2001 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COST AND BENEFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON
STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 43 (2001).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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Informal reviews are most common when there is a statutory or legal
deadline for a rule, or when the rule is extremely large and requires
discussion with other federal agencies besides OMB. EPA and the
Departments of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and
Transportation often issue those types of rules, and therefore are more
likely to have their rules reviewed informally before formal submission.
Informal review can be much more important in the rule-development
process than formal reviews, and can last much longer. For example, on
October 30, 2001, EPA sent a draft proposed rule to OIRA in which the
agency proposed that nonconformance penalties be made available for the
2004 and later model year non-methane hydrocarbons and nitrogen oxides
standard for heavy-duty diesel engines and vehicles. 113 To determine
penalty amounts, EPA used a three percent discount rate in calculating
certain compliance and fuel costs. 114 During the next six weeks, EPA sent
at least three other versions of the rule to OIRA for “informal review.” 115
Throughout this period, OIRA suggested using a seven percent discount
rate instead of three percent, which would have the effect of reducing the
penalty amounts cited in the rule. 116 By the time EPA submitted the rule to
OIRA for formal review on December 10, 2001, EPA switched to the seven
percent rate. 117 OMB completed its review on December 20, 2001.118 The
informal review period lasted four times as long as the formal period (at
least forty-one days versus ten days) and most of the substantive changes to
the rule appear to have occurred during informal review. 119 In other cases,
the formal OIRA review period for significant rules was as short as one
day. 120
OIRA has informally reviewed agencies’ draft rules since its review
function was established in 1981, but informal reviews reportedly became
more common when Executive Order 12,866 was adopted in 1993 and

113. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 189-91.
114. Id. at 163.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 47 (“[T]he formal review period itself may be somewhat of an artificial
construct.”).
120. Id. at 175. For example, OIRA formally reviewed a joint rule defining “fill
material” under the Clean Water Act that had been developed by EPA and the Department
of the Army’s Corps of Engineers in one day—from May 1, 2002, until May 2, 2002. The
agencies made a number of changes to the rule at OIRA’s suggestion, indicating that the
rule had been reviewed extensively before it was formally submitted. See Final Revisions to
the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions of “Fill Material” and “Discharge of Fill
Material,” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (May 9, 2002).
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OIRA’s reviews were focused on “significant” rules. 121 OIRA appears to
have increased its use of informal reviews even further in recent years. For
example, in its March 2002 draft report to Congress on the costs and
benefits of federal regulation, OIRA wrote, “agencies are beginning to
invite OIRA staff into earlier phases of regulatory development in order to
prevent returns late in the rulemaking process. It is at these early stages
where OIRA’s analytic approach can most improve on the quality of
regulatory analyses and the substance of rules.” 122 Separately, in 2002, the
OIRA Administrator stated, “an increasing number of agencies are
becoming more receptive to early discussions with OMB, at least on highly
significant rulemakings.” 123
The OIRA Administrator also indicated that agencies’ “receptivity” to
informal reviews may be enhanced by the possibility of a returned rule.
For example, in early 2002, he said that OIRA was trying to:
[c]reate an incentive for agencies to come to us when they know they
have something that in the final analysis is going to be something we’re
going to be looking at carefully. And I think that agencies that wait until
the last minute and then come to us—well, in a sense, they’re rolling the
dice. 124

EFFECTS OF OIRA’S REVIEWS
Although a great deal has been written about OIRA’s reviews of
agencies’ draft rules, few studies have systematically tried to determine the
extent to which the office’s reviews result in substantive changes to the
rules. One such study concluded that OIRA’s reviews resulted in the
rejection of some regulations that would have been economically
inefficient, but did not appear to have improved the cost-effectiveness (e.g.,
costs-per-life saved) of many of the rules.125 Other studies have used
OIRA’s database showing the number of rules that were coded as
“consistent with change” and “consistent without change” in an attempt to

121. Interview with OIRA representatives, in Old Executive Office Building,
Washington, D.C. (2003). See note 38 supra.
122. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of
Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014, 15,018 (Mar. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/cbreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
123. John D. Graham, Remarks Prepared for the American Hospital Association (July 17,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham_ama071702.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2006).
124. Rebecca Adams, Regulating the Rulemakers: John Graham at OIRA, CQ WEEKLY,
Feb. 23, 2002, 520-26.
125. SCOTT FARROW, BROOKINGS INST., IMPROVING REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: DOES
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OVERSIGHT MATTER? 24 (2000).
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determine the significance of OIRA’s effects on agencies’ rules, and on
whether those effects have changed over time. 126
As discussed previously, however, the “consistent with change” code
includes changes made at the initiation of the agencies, as well as changes
suggested by OIRA. Also, the code does not differentiate between minor
editorial changes and changes that radically alter the effect of the rule. In
addition, the terms “returns” and “withdrawals” in OIRA’s database require
careful consideration. A return may be made for purely administrative
reasons, not for substantive OIRA objections. Conversely, an agency’s
withdrawal of a rule may have been initiated by OIRA. Therefore, in order
to use these data effectively, researchers should examine the associated
documentation in the agencies’ and OIRA’s rulemaking dockets.
GAO’S ANALYSIS OF OIRA’S EFFECTS
GAO published such an analysis in September 2003, supplementing
information from OMB’s database with information in the dockets and
through interviews with agency officials. 127 GAO reported that, from July
1, 2001 through June 30, 2002, OIRA completed 642 reviews of agencies’
draft proposed and final rules. 128 Of these:
• About thirty-three percent (214) were coded in the database as
“consistent with no change,” indicating that OIRA considered the rules as
submitted consistent with Executive Order 12,866.129
• About fifty percent (322) were coded as “consistent with change,”
indicating that the rules had changed after being submitted to OIRA, and
that OIRA subsequently concluded that the rule was consistent with the
Executive Order’s requirements. 130
• About eight percent (fifty) were coded as “withdrawn” by the
agency. 131
• About three percent (twenty-one) were coded as “returned” to the
agency by OIRA. 132
• About five percent (thirty-five) had some other disposition (e.g., “sent
improperly,” “emergency,” or “statutory or judicial deadline”). 133
126. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical
Investigation, 70 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 821-885, 843-45 (2003).
127. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 27.
128. Id. at 69.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 70.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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In order to make its review manageable, GAO focused on eight-five of
those rules that were coded as changed, withdrawn, or returned, and that
were submitted to OIRA by nine selected health, safety, or environmental
agencies or offices: the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service within
the Department of Agriculture; the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
within the Department of Health and Human Services; the Occupational
Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) within the Department of Labor;
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration, and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT);
and the offices of air and radiation, water, solid waste, and emergency
response within EPA. 134 Seventy-one of the eighty-five rules had been
coded “consistent with change,” nine were coded as “returned,” and five
were coded as “withdrawn.” 135
OIRA’S IMPACT ON RULES
GAO’s analysis of the underlying documents indicated that OIRA had a
significant effect on at least twenty-five of the eighty-five draft rules. 136
Specifically:
• Of the seventy-one “changed” rules, GAO concluded that OIRA had
suggested significant changes to seventeen of them—changes that affected
the scope, impact, or estimated costs or benefits of the rules as originally
submitted. 137 In general, the focus of OIRA’s suggested changes appeared
to be on reducing regulatory burden (and, in some cases, the expected
benefits as well). 138 For example, at OIRA’s recommendation, EPA
removed manganese from a list of hazardous wastes, deleted certain types
of engines from coverage of a rule setting emissions standards, and delayed
the compliance dates for two other types of emissions.139 Of the remaining
fifty-four “changed” rules, the most significant alterations made at OIRA’s
suggestion involved adding explanatory language to the preambles of the
rules and asking for comment on particular provisions. In twenty of the
fifty-four rules, OIRA suggested only minor editorial changes (e.g.,
correcting spelling errors or citations), or made no suggestions at all.140
• Of the nine rules that had been returned to the agencies by OIRA
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 79.
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during the review period, two were returned because they had been
improperly submitted, not because of substantive defects. 141 OIRA
returned the remaining seven rules because of concerns about the agencies’
regulatory analyses or a perceived lack of coordination between rulemaking
agencies. 142 For example, OIRA returned one EPA rule because the
agency did not provide a quantitative analysis of costs and benefits, and
returned a NHTSA rule because OIRA did not believe that the agency had
demonstrated that it had selected the best available alternative. 143 Five of
the seven rules returned for substantive reasons had been submitted by the
FAA. 144
• Of the five rules that were withdrawn, GAO determined that only one
had been withdrawn primarily at OIRA’s suggestion. 145 The other four
rules were withdrawn solely at the agencies’ initiative or as a result of a
mutual decision by the agencies and OIRA. 146
OIRA review had a greater effect on certain agencies’ rules than others.
As Table 2 illustrates, OIRA had a significant effect on thirteen (seventysix percent) of the twenty-two rules submitted by EPA’s Office of Air and
Radiation and Office of Water (i.e., changes to the scope, impact, and
estimated costs and benefits of the rules). In contrast, OIRA had a
significant effect on only four (eight percent) of the forty-nine rules
submitted by other agencies and offices. In these cases, OIRA review most
frequently resulted in additional explanatory language in the rules’
preambles, requests for comments on particular provisions, or minor
editorial changes.

TABLE 2: EPA AIR/RADIATION AND WATER RULES WERE MOST
AFFECTED BY OIRA REVIEW 147
Rules where changes suggested by OIRA
were:
Agency

Significant

Material

Minor/None

Total

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 80.
144. Id. at 79.
145. Id. at 81.
146. Id.
147. These data were prepared by the author as a summary of general research to be
included in a 2003 GAO report. See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 75.

COPELAND_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:22 PM

ROLE OF OIRA IN FEDERAL RULEMAKING

EPA Office
Radiation

of

and 7

4

3

14

6

2

0

8

All other agencies and offices in 4
review

28

17

49

Total

34

20

71

EPA Office of Water

Air

127

17

Although this GAO study highlights the effects that OIRA can have on
agencies’ rules, it also probably understates the influence that OIRA has on
agencies’ rules because the findings were often limited to the
documentation that was available in agencies and OIRA’s dockets. As
noted previously, if OIRA suggested a change to a rule before it was
formally submitted to OIRA (i.e., during informal review), GAO’s analysis
might not reflect those changes. In fact, if a rule was significantly changed
by OIRA during several rounds of informal review, but was unchanged
during formal review, it would not have even been in the universe of rules
that GAO examined (i.e., those coded in the OIRA database as changed,
returned, or withdrawn during OIRA’s formal review). Other forms of
OIRA influence on rulemaking may be even more indirect and harder to
document. For example, some agencies have indicated that they do not
even propose certain regulatory provisions because they believe that OIRA
would find them objectionable. 148
REGULATED ENTITIES’ CONTACTS WITH OIRA
GAO also reported in its study that regulated entities directly contacted
OIRA either before or during its review process regarding eleven of the
twenty-five rules that OIRA significantly affected.149 Eight of those eleven
cases involved EPA rules, and the nature of the contacts ranged from
meetings with OIRA representatives to letters sent to OIRA. 150 In seven of
the eleven cases, GAO concluded that what OIRA ultimately recommended
to the rulemaking agencies was akin to what these regulated parties
recommended to OIRA—in some cases, using similar language to that used

148. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-96-185, REGULATORY REFORM:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGULATORY REVIEW EXECUTIVE ORDER 10 (1996) [hereinafter
GAO, REGULATORY REFORM]. DOT officials told GAO that they will not even propose
certain regulatory provisions because they know that OIRA will find them unacceptable. Id.
149. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 89. Environmental and public interest groups
also contacted OIRA regarding three of the rules. Id.
150. Id.
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by the regulated entities.151 Some examples include the following:
• During OIRA’s review of an EPA rule on identification and listing of
hazardous waste, industry representatives met with, and sent letters to
OIRA opposing the listing of manganese as a hazardous waste
constituent (the industry representatives had made essentially the same
argument to EPA during the public comment phase, but EPA did not
agree). 152 The main focus of OIRA’s comments to EPA at the conclusion
of its review was that final action on listing manganese as a hazardous
contaminant should be deferred. 153
• Representatives of automobile manufacturers contacted OIRA and
argued that a NHTSA draft final rule on tire pressure monitoring systems
should have permitted the use of indirect, as well as direct, sensing
technologies (not just direct technologies, as in the draft rule).154 OIRA
returned the rule to NHTSA for reconsideration, questioning whether the
agency had selected the best available regulatory option. OIRA later
approved (as “consistent with no change”) a resubmitted rule that allowed
either direct or indirect technologies until 2006.155
Notwithstanding the congruence between the comments of the regulated
entities and OIRA’s comments, GAO said it was impossible to determine
the extent to which these or other suggestions made by the regulated
entities might have influenced OIRA’s actions, if at all. 156 For example,
OIRA may have independently reached the same conclusions as the
regulated entities.

CHANGES IN OIRA’S POLICIES AND PRACTICES DURING THE GEORGE
W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION
The formal process by which OIRA reviews agencies’ draft rules has

151. Id. at 91.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. In August 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated this
rule as inconsistent with the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and
Documentation (TREAD) Act upon which it was based. See Public Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta,
340 F. 3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 2003). NHTSA issued a new final rule on April 8, 2005. See
Rules and Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 18,129, 18,136 (Apr. 8, 2005). According to one
observer, the rule as initially provided to OIRA may have survived judicial review. See
Cindy Skrzycki, Public Citizen, Bridgestone Fight Tire Rule, WASH. POST, Jun. 21, 2005, at
D1.
156. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 91-92.
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changed little since Executive Order 12,866 was issued in 1993.157 There
have, however, been several subtle yet notable changes in OIRA policies
and practices in recent years—particularly after OIRA Administrator John
D. Graham took office in July 2001. In October 2002, Administrator
Graham said, “the changes we are making at OMB in pursuit of smarter
regulation are not headline grabbers: No far-reaching legislative initiatives,
no rhetoric-laden executive orders, and no campaigns of regulatory relief.
Yet we are making some changes that we believe will have a long-lasting
impact on the regulatory state.” 158
RETURN OF THE “GATEKEEPER” ROLE
As noted previously, during the Reagan Administration, OIRA was often
criticized for acting as a regulatory “gatekeeper,” actively overseeing and
recommending changes to agencies’ rules. 159 During the Clinton
Administration, however, the opposite concerns were expressed. A number
of observers criticized OIRA for not overseeing the actions of the
rulemaking agencies more aggressively. 160 In September 1996, OIRA
Administrator Sally Katzen testified that “we have consciously changed the
way we relate to the agencies,” and described OIRA’s relationship with the
rulemaking agencies as “collegial” and “constructive.” 161 She also said she
agreed with an article which stated that OIRA functioned during that period
“more as a counselor during the review process than as an enforcer of the
executive order.” 162
During the George W. Bush Administration, OIRA has returned to the
role it assumed during the Reagan Administration, even describing itself in
an annual report as the “gatekeeper for new rulemakings.” 163 OIRA

157. There has been only one amendment to Executive Order 12,866 since it was issued.
As mentioned earlier, Executive Order 13,258 reassigned all roles originally assigned to the
Vice President in Executive Order 12,866 (e.g., principal advisor to the President on
regulatory policy, planning, and review) to the President’s Chief of Staff. See supra note 78
and accompanying text.
158. John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Presidential Oversight of the Regulatory
State: Can It Work?, Address before the Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon University (Oct. 4,
2002).
159. See, e.g., EADS & FIX, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., GATTUSO, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
161. See Oversight of Regulatory Review Activities of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs: Hearing before the U.S. Subcomm. on Financial Management &
Accountability of the H. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996).
162. William Niskanen, Clinton’s Regulatory Record: Policies, Process, and Outcomes,
19 REGULATION 3, 27-28, (1996).
163. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, STIMULATING SMARTER REGULATION: 2002 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED
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Administrator Graham has said that one of the office’s functions is “to
protect people from poorly designed rules,” and that OIRA review is a way
to “combat the tunnel vision that plagues the thinking of single-mission
regulators.” 164 He has also compared OIRA’s review of agencies’ rules to
OMB’s role in reviewing agencies’ budget requests. 165 This “return to the
gatekeeper” perspective of OIRA’s role has implications for an array of
OIRA’s functions, and underlies many of the other changes described
below.
INCREASED (AND THEN DECREASED) USE OF RETURN LETTERS
As indicated Table 1, during the Clinton Administration, OIRA only
rarely returned rules to the agencies for reconsideration.166 Specifically,
according to OIRA’s database, of the more than 4,000 rules that OIRA
reviewed from 1994 through 2000, OIRA returned only seven rules to the
agencies—three in 1995 and four in 1997. OIRA Administrators during
that period said they viewed the use of return letters as evidence of the
failure of the collaborative review process, since OIRA and the agencies
were part of the same presidential administration.167
In contrast, OIRA Administrator Graham referred to return letters as the
office’s “ultimate weapon,” viewing them as a way to make clear that the
office is serious about the review process. 168 In the first six months after
he took office in July 2001, OIRA returned eighteen draft rules to the
agencies for reconsideration. 169 DOT had the most rules returned during
2001 and 2002 (eight), followed by the Social Security Administration
(five) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (four).170 The letters

MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 14 (2002).
164. John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Remarks to the Board of Trustees, The
Keystone
Ctr.,
Washington,
D.C.,
Jun.
18,
2002,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/keystone_speech061802.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2006).
165. John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Remarks prepared for delivery to the
National Economists Club, Presidential Management of the Regulatory State, Mar. 7, 2002,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/testimony/graham030702.html (last
visited Apr. 27, 2006).
166. See supra tbl.1.
167. See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 42-43.
168. John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Remarks prepared for the American Hospital
Association, Stimulating Smarter Regulation: OMB’s Role, July 17, 2002, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham_ama071702.html (last visited Apr. 27,
2006).
169. See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 41-42.
170. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OIRA Return Letters, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return_letter.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
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commonly indicated that OIRA returned the rules because of concerns
about the agencies’ analyses (e.g., questioning whether the agencies had
considered all reasonable alternatives or had selected the alternative that
would yield the greatest net benefits).171
Subsequently, however, the pace of OIRA’s return letters slowed
dramatically. Although the average number of rules that OIRA reviewed
each month stayed about the same, in the four years from March 2002 until
March 2006, OIRA returned a total of six draft rules to the agencies—a
dramatic decline from the twenty-one returns during Administrator
Graham’s first eight months in office.172 Only one rule was returned in
2004, and one more in 2005—keeping about the same pace as the Clinton
administration. OIRA officials attributed the decline in return letters to the
improved quality of agencies’ regulatory submissions after the initial flurry
of returns. 173 For example, in his November 2005 comments marking the
twenty-fifth anniversary of OIRA, Administrator Graham said, “we rarely
need to issue a return letter” because agencies now “work with us to fix
problems or they persuade us that there is no problem to fix.” 174
ADVENT (AND THEN DECLINE) OF PROMPT LETTERS
OIRA has traditionally been a reactive force in the rulemaking process,
commenting on draft proposed and final rules that are generated by the
agencies. Although OIRA occasionally suggested regulatory topics to the
agencies during previous administrations, the practice was relatively
uncommon and the discussions were not made public. In contrast, OIRA
Administrator Graham was more publicly proactive, sending several
agencies “prompt letters” (and posting them on the OIRA web site)
suggesting that they develop regulations in a particular area or encouraging
the agencies’ ongoing efforts. 175 For example, one such letter encouraged
NHTSA to give greater priority to modifying its frontal occupant protection
standard, and another letter suggested that OSHA make the promotion of
automatic external heart defibrillators a higher priority. 176 Other prompt
171. See id.
172. See id. Two of the five returns during this period involved the same DOT rule.
173. Interviews with OMB officials, in Old Executive Office Building, Washington, D.C.
(2003). See note 38 supra.
174. JOHN GRAHAM, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, THE
“SMART-REGULATION” AGENDA: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 5 (2005) [hereinafter
GRAHAM, SMART REGULATION].
175. For sample OIRA prompt letters, see Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OIRA Prompt
Letters, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2006).
176. Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to the Honorable Michael P.
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letters recommended that the agencies better focus certain research or
programs, and some made no recommendations at all. 177 Several of the
agencies took action in response to the letters, but few new rulemakings
have directly resulted from them. For example, one of OIRA’s first prompt
letters urged FDA to give greater priority to issuing a rule on the trans-fatty
acid content of foods. 178 Although OIRA Administrator Graham cited the
issuance of an FDA rule on trans-fats as an illustration of the effect of the
prompt letters, he also noted that the rulemaking had begun during the
previous administration. 179
OIRA sent agencies four prompt letters in September 2001, six by the
end of that year, and a total of at least thirteen by the end of 2003.180 Since
then, however, the number of prompt letter has diminished substantially.
OIRA issued only two prompt letters in 2004, and none were issued in
2005. 181 It is not clear why OIRA’s use of prompt letters has declined so
sharply. However, it is possible that OIRA may have reverted back to its
previous approach of making more private rulemaking and regulatory
suggestions to the agencies.
INCREASED EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (USUALLY)
Although OIRA has always encouraged agencies to provide welldeveloped economic analyses for their draft rules, Administrator Graham
expressed greater interest in this issue than his predecessors. Also,
according to agency officials, there was a perceptible “stepping up the bar”
in the amount of support required for their rules, with OIRA reportedly
more often looking for regulatory benefits to be quantified and a cost-

Jackson, Deputy Secretary, Dep’t of Transp. (Dec. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/nhsta_prompt120701.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2006); see also Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to the Honorable John
Henshaw, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Occupation Safety & Health Admin. (Sept. 18,
2001), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/osha_prompt_letter.html (last
visited Apr. 21, 2006).
177. For example, one such letter was essentially a press release that touted an effort by
OIRA and EPA in which they worked together to develop a proposed rule on non-road
diesel engines. See Env’tl Protection Agency, EPA and OMB Working To Speed the
Reduction of Pollution From Nonroad Diesel Engines 1 (June 7, 2002), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/r-117.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
178. Letter from John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, to the Honorable Tommy G.
Thompson, Sec’y of Health & Human Serv. (Sept. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/hhs_prompt_letter.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2006).
179. GRAHAM, SMART REGULATION, supra note 174, at 5-6.
180. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 48.
181. See OIRA Prompt Letters, supra note 175. OIRA most recently issued a prompt
letter to EPA in April 2006, which was the first since November 2004. Id.

COPELAND_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

ROLE OF OIRA IN FEDERAL RULEMAKING

2/3/2011 10:22 PM

133

benefit analysis for every regulatory option that the agency considered, not
just the option selected. 182 In September 2003, OIRA published OMB
Circular A-4, which contained guidelines for economic analysis under the
Executive Order that updated the “best practices” guidelines issued in
January 1996. 183 The new economic analysis guidelines were generally
similar to the earlier guidance, but differed in several key areas—e.g.,
encouraging agencies to (1) perform both cost-effectiveness and costbenefit analyses in support of their major rules,184 (2) use multiple discount
rates when the benefits and costs of rules are expected to occur in different
time periods, and (3) use a formal probability analysis of benefits and costs
when a rule is expected to have more than a $1 billion impact on the
economy (unless the effects of the rule are clear).185
In its December 2005 report to Congress on the costs and benefits of
federal regulations, OMB asserted that, “[r]egulation that is based on solid
economic analysis and sound science is also more likely to provide greater
benefits to society at less cost than regulation that is not.” 186 However,
OIRA has also signaled that these analyses are sometimes difficult if not
impossible to conduct for certain types of rules. For example, as OIRA
Administrator Graham said in November 2005, “[h]omeland security
regulations account for about half of our major-rule costs in 2004 but we do
not yet have a feasible way to fully quantify benefits. A moment’s
reflection will reveal some of the perplexing issues: how do we identify
targets of potential terrorist attacks, the probability of attacks and
associated damages, and the effectiveness of various countermeasures in

182. See GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 44-45.
183. See OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 99.
184. Cost-benefit analysis involves the systematic identification of all costs and benefits
associated with a forthcoming regulation. Cost-effectiveness analysis seeks to determine
how a given goal can be achieved at the least cost. In contrast to cost-benefit analysis, the
concern in cost-effectiveness analysis is not with weighing the merits of the goal, but with
identifying and analyzing the costs of alternatives to reach that goal (e.g., dollars per life
saved).
185. See OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 99. Discounting can have a significant effect
on the present value of future health benefits. For example, in a February 2003 speech,
Administrator Graham noted that the present value of 1,000 lives saved fifty years in the
future is only thirty-four lives in present value when evaluated at a seven percent discount
rate. See John D. Graham, OIRA Administrator, Valuing Health: An OMB Perspective,
Remarks Prepared for the Conference on Valuing Health Outcomes: An Assessment of
Approaches
(Feb.
13,
2003),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/rff_speech_feb13.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
186. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND UNFUNDED
MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 33 (2005) [hereinafter OMB,
VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS].
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reducing risk?” 187 Administrator Graham reportedly said that cost-benefit
analysis may not be appropriate for these homeland security rules, and that
a more practical “soft” test was being used for them. 188
Some observers have questioned why assessments of costs or benefits
for these homeland security rules are qualitatively different from, or more
difficult than, assessing the costs and benefits associated with many health,
safety, or environmental rules, and therefore why these homeland security
rules appear to be less rigorously reviewed by OIRA. In the words of Sally
Katzen, OIRA Administrator during the Clinton Administration: “So when
it matters to them to get rules out quickly, they wink and blink. But in
areas of public health and safety, where they have longstanding relations
with the business communities involved, they’re insistent on satisfying
these standards.” 189
INCREASED TRANSPARENCY (SOMEWHAT)
As noted previously, many of the longstanding concerns about OIRA’s
role in the rulemaking process have centered on the perceived lack of
transparency of its reviews. 190 Executive Order 12,866 attempted to
address some of those concerns by requiring that, after a rule is published,
an agency must disclose the changes it made to the rule during OIRA’s
review, and the changes it made at the suggestion or recommendation of
OIRA. 191 This Executive Order requires OIRA to maintain a publicly
available log disclosing the status of all regulatory actions under review,
and the names and dates of those involved in substantive oral
communications (e.g., meetings and telephone calls) between OIRA staff
and parties outside of the executive branch.192 These requirements
notwithstanding, concerns about the lack of transparency continued. For
example, even after issuance of the executive order, OIRA disclosed
contacts with outside parties only if they occurred during the office’s
sometimes brief formal review period, not if they occurred during its
informal reviews.
In October 2001, Administrator Graham published a memorandum to
OIRA staff on the office’s web site that extended the Executive Order’s

187. GRAHAM, SMART REGULATION, supra note 174, at 8.
188. See Nancy Ognanovich, Head of OMB Regulatory Office Says Analyzing Homeland
Security Rules Difficult, BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Nov. 8, 2005, at A39.
189. Rebecca Adams, Graham Leaves OIRA With a Full Job Jar, CQ WEEKLY, Jan. 23,
2006, at 226.
190. See, e.g., GAO, REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 148, at 8.
191. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, at 51,739.
192. Id.
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disclosure requirements in several areas. 193 For example, the memorandum
said that OIRA would disclose substantive meetings and other contacts
with outside parties about a rule under review even if OIRA was only
informally reviewing the rule, 194 and that it would disclose substantive
telephone calls with outside parties that were initiated by the Administrator,
not just calls initiated by outside parties. 195 Further, OIRA announced that
it would be expanding its web site, posting lists of regulations currently
under review, 196 reviews it concluded in the previous thirty days, 197 and its
meeting records with outside parties.198
As discussed in more detail later in this Article, however, OIRA’s
regulatory reviews are still far from transparent. Agencies are still
instructed not to disclose changes that OIRA suggests during informal
reviews, and the meeting log on OIRA’s web site does not clearly delineate
the subjects of OIRA’s outside meetings or the affiliations of those present
at the meetings. 199 Also, as noted previously, OIRA’s database showing
rules “changed” during its review is not an accurate indication of the rules
that were substantively changed by OIRA.
CHANGES IN OIRA STAFFING
When OIRA was created in fiscal year 1981, the office had a “full-time
equivalent” (FTE) ceiling of ninety staff members. 200 By 1997, OIRA’s
193. Memorandum from John D. Graham, Administrator, for OIRA Staff (Oct. 18, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/oira_disclosure_memo-b.html (last
visited May 23, 2006).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Order Submission Under Review,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/library/OMBREGSP.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
197. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Order Review in the Last 30 Days,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/library/OMBREGSC.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
198. For a list of OIRA’s meetings with outside parties, see Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
Meeting Records, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/meetings.html (last
visited Apr. 18, 2006). For a list of OMB’s oral communications, see Office of Mgmt. &
Budget,
Oral
Communications
Record,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/oral_communications.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2006).
199. To
view
OIRA’s
meeting
log,
see
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/meetings.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2006). As GAO
indicated in its 2003 report, OIRA’s descriptions of its contacts with outside parties did not
always clearly indicate what rule was being discussed or what organizations those parties
represented.
200. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 59. FTE data are typically used in a budgetary
context, and are a useful way to compare staffing strength over time or across entities. For
example, one employee working forty hours per week for a year would be considered one
FTE, and two employees who each work twenty hours a week for a year would also be
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FTE allocation had declined to forty-seven—a nearly fifty percent
reduction. 201 Although Executive Order 12,866 (issued in late 1993)
permitted OIRA to focus its resources on “significant” rules, this decline in
OIRA staffing also occurred during a period in which regulatory agencies’
staffing and budgetary levels were increasing and OIRA was given a
number of new statutory responsibilities.202
Starting in 2001, OIRA’s staffing authorization began to increase
somewhat, and by 2003 it stood at fifty-five FTEs. 203 Between 2001 and
2003, OIRA hired five new staff members in such fields as epidemiology,
risk assessment, engineering, and health economics. OIRA representatives
indicated that these new hires reflected the increasing importance of
science-based regulation in federal agencies, and would enable OIRA to
ask penetrating technical questions about agency proposals. 204
OIRA’S OTHER STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES
In addition to its regulatory review responsibilities under Executive
Order 12,866, and its multiple responsibilities under the Paperwork
Reduction Act (including paperwork review, information resources
management, statistical policy and coordination, records management,
privacy and security, and information technology), Congress has assigned
OIRA a number of other specific functions related to the rulemaking and
regulatory process. For example:
• The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 generally requires
agencies to prepare written statements describing the effects of their rules
that are subject to the Act’s requirements on state, local, and tribal
governments, and the private sector.205 The Act requires the director of
OMB to collect those written statements and provide them to the
Congressional Budget Office, to establish pilot programs to test innovative
regulatory approaches, and to prepare an annual report on the
implementation of the act. 206 The OMB director has delegated these
responsibilities to OIRA.
considered one FTE.
201. Id.
202. See Regulatory Right-to-Know Act of 1999, 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (2000); Small
Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000); Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000). These acts assigned OIRA various
duties, which are further discussed in notes 205-209 infra and accompanying text.
203. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 60.
204. Interview with OIRA representatives, in Old Executive Office Building,
Washington, D.C. (2003). See note 38 supra.
205. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 § 1532.
206. Id.
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• The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996
(SBREFA) requires EPA and OSHA to convene “advocacy review panels”
before publishing proposed rules expected to have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.207 The Act specifically
requires the review panel to include full-time employees from OIRA, as
well as other agencies. 208
• SBREFA also contains provisions commonly referred to as the
“Congressional Review Act,” which (among other things) requires agencies
to delay the effective date of “major” rules, and requires GAO to submit a
report on those rules within fifteen days of their issuance. 209 SBREFA
defines a major rule as one that the OIRA administrator concludes has
resulted or is likely to result in (among other things) a $100 million annual
effect on the economy.
• The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for 2001,
generally known as the “Data Quality Act” or the “Information Quality
Act,” directed OMB to take several actions, all of which were delegated to
OIRA. 210 Specifically, the Act required OMB to issue government-wide
guidelines that “provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal
agencies for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by
Federal agencies.” 211 OMB published those guidelines in final form on
February 22, 2002. 212 The Act also required agencies to develop their own
guidelines (which were reviewed by OMB), and to report to OMB on the
number and nature of complaints received and the manner in which such
complaints were handled by the agency. 213
• Section 624 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations
Act of 2001, sometimes known as the “Regulatory Right-to-Know Act,”
requires OMB to prepare and submit with the budget an annual “accounting
statement and associated report” containing an estimate of the costs and
benefits (including quantifiable and non-quantifiable effects) of federal

207. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act § 244.
208. Id.
209. For a more complete discussion of the Congressional Review Act, see Morton
Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking?: A Brief
Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1051, 1092 (1999).
210. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2001, 44 U.S.C. § 3516
(2001).
211. Id.
212. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality,
Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed.
Reg. 8,451 (Feb. 22, 2002).
213. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2001 § 3516.
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rules and paperwork, to the extent feasible, (1) in the aggregate, (2) by
agency and agency program, and (3) by major rule. 214 The accounting
statement is also required to contain an analysis of impacts of federal
regulation on state, local, and tribal governments, small businesses, wages,
and economic growth. Similar one-year requirements were in previous
appropriations acts.215
• The Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002 required OMB to
annually publish, in the Federal Register and on the Internet, a list of the
compliance assistance resources available to small businesses. 216 The Act
also requires OMB to convene and chair a task force to study the feasibility
of streamlining paperwork requirements on small businesses. 217 The task
force was required to file an initial report by the end of June 2003, and to
file a final report by the end of June 2004. 218
• The E-Government Act requires the OIRA administrator to work with
the administrator of OMB’s Office of Electronic Government to establish
the strategic direction of the government-wide e-government program and
to oversee its implementation. 219 As discussed later in this article, OIRA
has been particularly active in the Administration’s e-rulemaking
initiative. 220
• In the 2002 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act,221
Congress stated that about $6.3 million of OMB’s $70.7 million
appropriation was for OIRA, but stipulated that nearly $1.6 million of that
amount would not be obligated until OMB “submits a report to the
Committees on Appropriations that provides an assessment of the total
costs and benefits of implementing Executive Order No. 13,166.” 222
Congress also sometimes limits OIRA’s actions through riders on
OMB’s appropriation. For example, since 1983, language has been

214. Regulatory Right-to-Know Act § 624.
215. OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS, supra note 186, at 141.
216. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act § 241.
217. Id.
218. See SMALL BUS. PAPERWORK RELIEF ACT TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT (2004),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/sbpr2004.pdf (last visited Apr. 6,
2006).
219. E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2002).
220. See note 257 infra and accompanying text.
221. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-67,
115 Stat. 514.
222. Id. See also Assessment of the Total Benefits and Costs of Implementing Executive
Order No. 13,166: Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English
Proficiency (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/lepfinal314.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) (responding to congressional request by using available
data to estimate benefits and costs).

COPELAND_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:22 PM

ROLE OF OIRA IN FEDERAL RULEMAKING

139

included in OMB’s appropriation stating that none of the funds
appropriated to OMB could be used for the purpose of reviewing any
agricultural marketing orders issued by the Department of Agriculture.223
Marketing orders, which cover dozens of commodities from lemons to milk
and generally keep prices up by regulating supplies, were targeted for
elimination or amendment by President Reagan’s task force on regulatory
relief in the early 1980s. 224 In response, members of Congress have
inserted this restriction in each subsequent appropriation bill, asserting that
the Department of Agriculture, not OMB, has statutory authority in this
area. At other times, riders have been included in OMB’s appropriation
preventing the office from taking other actions (e.g., altering the transcript
of witnesses’ testimony before certain committees). 225
RECENT OIRA INITIATIVES
Although OIRA’s workload has clearly increased as a consequence of a
series of congressional requirements, OIRA has also has also voluntarily
taken on additional responsibilities, often basing its actions on the office’s
interpretation of previous statutory or executive order authority or
requirements. Some of these actions (e.g., the issuance of bulletins on peer
review, guidance, and risk assessment) have been viewed as direct attempts
by OIRA to expand its influence over agencies. Other OIRA initiatives
may have that effect more indirectly, appearing in some cases to be similar
in many respects to the unsuccessful legislative efforts at regulatory reform
in the mid-to-late 1990s.
SOLICITING SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM OF EXISTING RULES
In addition to requiring an annual “accounting statement” of the costs
and benefits of regulations, the above-mentioned “Regulatory Right-to223. For example, OMB’s appropriation for fiscal year 2006 provides, “none of the funds
appropriated in this Act for the Office of Management and Budget may be used for the
purpose of reviewing any agricultural marketing orders or any activities or regulations under
the provisions of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.” See Transportation,
Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, The Judiciary, The District of Columbia, and
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, H.R. 3058,109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ115.109.pdf (last visited May
12, 2006).
224. JAMES L. GATTUSO, HERITAGE FOUND., THE HIGH COSTS AND LOW RETURNS OF
FARM
MARKETING
ORDERS
(1985),
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Agriculture/bg462.cfm.
225. Id. OMB’s fiscal year 2006 appropriation excepted from this prohibition only the
testimony of OMB witnesses before the committees on appropriations or their
subcommittees.
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Know Act” also requires OMB to include “recommendations for reform” in
its cost-benefit reports. 226 OIRA could have interpreted this requirement
narrowly as requiring recommendations to reform the accounting statement
or, more generally, to reform the rulemaking process. Instead, OIRA
interpreted the provision to mean that OMB must make recommendations
of specific rules to be reformed. Further, rather than relying on the
expertise it honed in reviewing hundreds of significant rules each year,
OIRA decided to solicit suggestions from the public regarding specific
rules to be “reformed.” For example, in May 2001, OIRA asked for
suggestions on specific regulations that could be “rescinded or changed that
would increase net benefits to the public.” 227 In response, OIRA received
seventy-one suggestions, which it placed into high, medium, and low
priority categories. 228 In March 2002, OIRA asked the public for
recommendations to eliminate or modify existing rules as well as to expand
or extend existing programs. 229 In response, OIRA received more than 300
suggestions, which it then turned over to the appropriate agencies for
prioritization.230 In February 2004, OIRA asked the public for suggested
reforms of rules affecting the manufacturing sector.231 OIRA said it was
focusing on manufacturing because of the relatively large impact that
regulations have on that sector. In March 2005, OIRA reported that it
received 189 reform nominations, of which federal agencies and OMB
determined that seventy-six had “potential merit and justify further

226. A similar one-year requirement for “recommendations for reform” was included in
the Fiscal Year 2000 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act. See Treasury
and General Government Appropriations Act of 2000 § 628(a)(3). Although business
groups generally applauded this “look back” effort, environmentalists and public interest
groups characterized it as the development of a “hit list” of rules that the Bush
Administration wanted to eliminate.
227. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT REPORT ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
FEDERAL
REGULATIONS
25,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg/cb_report_notice.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
228. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 104-105. Eight of the twenty-three suggestions
that OIRA designated a “high priority” involved EPA rules, and five involved rules from the
Department of Labor. Id.
229. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of
Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,013, 15,033 (Mar. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/cbreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
230. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 108-09 (describing these responses and noting
the ways in which the 2002 effort differed from the 2001 effort).
231. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, INFORMING REGULATORY DECISIONS: 2004 DRAFT
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND
UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 1 (2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/draft_2004_cbreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 24,
2006).

COPELAND_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

2/3/2011 10:22 PM

ROLE OF OIRA IN FEDERAL RULEMAKING

141

action.” 232
PEER REVIEW BULLETIN
In September 2003, OIRA published a proposed bulletin in the Federal
Register on “Peer Review and Information Quality” that would have, if
made final, provided a standardized process by which all significant
regulatory information would be peer reviewed.233 Issued under the
authority of the Information Quality Act, the PRA, and Executive Order
12,866, the bulletin would have required agencies to (1) have all
“significant regulatory information” that the agencies intend to disseminate
peer reviewed, (2) have “especially significant regulatory information” peer
reviewed according to even higher standards, and (3) provide OIRA with
information on an annual basis about upcoming significant regulatory
disseminations, and about the agency’s plans for conducting peer
reviews. 234 The proposed bulletin aroused significant controversy, with
some observers expressing concern that it could create a centralized peer
review system within OMB that would be vulnerable to political
manipulation or control by regulated entities. 235
In April 2004, OIRA published a revised version of the proposed
bulletin in response to nearly 200 comments received from the public.236
The revised bulletin was broader in scope than the proposed bulletin in that
it applied to “influential scientific information” (not just regulatory
information) and “highly influential scientific assessments.” 237 However,
agencies were given substantial discretion to decide whether information
was “influential” and therefore required a peer review, and the bulletin
provided exemptions for certain classes of information (e.g., routine
statistical information and products by government-funded scientists that

232. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY REFORM OF THE MANUFACTURING
SECTOR
2
(2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/reports/manufacturing_initiative.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2006).
233. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PEER REVIEW AND INFORMATION QUALITY (Aug.
2003),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer_review_and_info_quality.pdf (last visited
Apr. 24, 2006).
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Letter from Sidney A. Shapiro, Director, Ctr. for Progressive Regulation,
to Dr. Margo Schwab, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs (May 27, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer2004/57.pdf last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
236. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REVISED INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR
PEER
REVIEW
(2004),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/peer_review041404.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
237. Id.
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are not represented as the views of the agency). 238 In January 2005, OIRA
published a final version of the bulletin in the Federal Register that was
similar in many respects to the revised version. 239 OMB still retained
significant authority in certain areas (e.g., when information is “highly
influential”), so it is unclear how much discretion agencies will be given to
decide when and what kind of peer review is required.
GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES BULLETIN
An even more recent potential expansion of OIRA’s influence occurred
in November 2005, when OMB published a “Proposed Bulletin for Good
Guidance Practices.” 240 Noting that agencies have increasingly relied on
guidance documents to inform the public about regulatory requirements
and to provide direction to their staff members, OMB said it was concerned
that these documents “may not receive the benefit of careful consideration
accorded under the procedures for regulatory development and review.” 241
OMB did not cite any specific statutes or executive orders as authorizing
the issuance of the bulletin, but it did indicate that it was “responsible both
for promoting good management practices and for overseeing and
coordinating the Administration’s regulatory policy.” 242
In essence, the proposed bulletin would require agencies (not including
independent regulatory agencies) to develop written procedures for the
approval of “significant” guidance documents (defined in essentially the
same way as “significant” rules in Executive Order 12,866), to maintain a
list of those documents on its web site, and to allow electronic comments
on those documents. For “economically significant” guidance documents
(e.g., those expected to have a $100 million impact on the economy),
agencies would be required to publish a notice in the Federal Register
announcing that the draft guidance document is available, inviting public

238. Id.
239. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review,
70 Fed. Reg. 2,664 (Jan. 14, 2005). OMB published the final bulletin on its web site on
December 15, 2004. Certain provisions took effect in June 2005, but others did not take
effect until December 2005.
240. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROPOSED BULLETIN FOR GOOD GUIDANCE PRACTICES
(Nov.
23,
2005),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/good_guid/good_guidance_preamble.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 6, 2006) [hereinafter OMB, PROPOSED BULLETIN]. On November 30, 2005,
OMB published a notice and request for comments on the proposed bulletin (but not the
bulletin itself) in the Federal Register. See Proposed Bulletin for Good Guidance Practices,
70 Fed. Reg. 71,866 (Nov. 30, 2005).
241. OMB, PROPOSED BULLETIN, supra note 240, at 2.
242. Id. at 1.
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comments, and responding to those comments. 243 Although the proposed
bulletin does not specifically provide a role for OIRA in the approval
process, some have expressed concerns that the bulletin could allow greater
opportunities for the office and industry to influence agency decision
making. 244 As was the case with the peer review bulletin, OIRA is
expected to retain significant discretion to decide which documents are
subject to the bulletin’s requirements.
RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN
As of early 2006, the most recent manifestation of OIRA’s self-initiated
expansion of its (at least potential) influence was its publication of a
proposed bulletin on agency risk assessment practices. 245 Released for
public comment and peer review by the National Academy of Sciences on
January 9, 2006, the stated purpose of the bulletin was “to enhance the
technical quality and objectivity of risk assessments prepared by federal
agencies by establishing uniform, minimum standards.” 246 The legal
authority cited for the bulletin included the Information Quality Act, the
Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, and “OMB’s general authorities to oversee
the quality of agency analyses, information and regulatory actions.”247
Public comments were requested on the proposed bulletin by June 2006,
with the bulletin going into effect twelve months after its publication in
final form. 248
Risk assessments are used in a variety of ways in the federal
government, and are particularly important in developing regulations
involving health, safety, or the environment. The OIRA bulletin described
a series of general risk assessment and reporting standards (e.g.,

243. Because guidance is, by definition, nonbinding, it is not clear how it could have a
$100 million impact on the economy, and therefore qualify as “economically significant.”
244. See, e.g., Cindy Skrzycki, Finding a Way to Better Guidance, WASH. POST, Dec. 20,
2005, at D1.
245. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN (2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/proposed_risk_assessment_bulletin_010906.pdf
(last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
246. Id. at 3.
247. Id. at 7. Specifically, OIRA noted that section 515(a) of the IQA requires OMB to
“provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing
the quality, objectivity, utility and integrity of information” disseminated by federal
agencies. Id. at 7. Also, OIRA said that the Regulatory Right-to-Know Act directs OMB to
“issue guidelines to agencies to standardize . . . measures of costs and benefits.” Id. One
could argue that OIRA had already satisfied these requirements through the issuance of its
February 2002 IQA guidelines and OMB Circular A-4.
248. Id. at 1.
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“summarize the scope of the assessment” and “be scientifically objective”),
with one set of standards specifically for risk assessments used in
regulatory analyses.249 It also laid out a set of “special standards for
influential risk assessments” (i.e., those expected to have a “clear and
substantial impact on important public policies or private sector
decisions”). 250 The scope of the bulletin is quite broad, subsuming all
agencies covered by the PRA (including independent regulatory agencies),
and defining risk assessment in sweeping terms. 251 The bulletin requires
agencies to certify that each covered risk assessment has complied with its
requirements, but allows agency heads to defer or waive some or all of its
requirements. 252 OIRA and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy were made responsible for overseeing the bulletin’s
implementation. 253
E-RULEMAKING OVERSIGHT
OIRA has also been significantly involved in the development of the
Bush Administration’s electronic rulemaking (“e-rulemaking”) initiative,
which some have also viewed as having the potential to increase the
office’s and regulated entities’ influence over agencies’ regulatory
actions. 254 In January 2003, the Bush Administration launched the
“Regulations.gov” web site as the first module of its e-rulemaking
initiative. 255 The web site permits the public to identify proposed rules that
are open for comment government-wide, and permits the public to
comment electronically on those rules. The second module of the initiative
is the development of a single, government-wide electronic docket for
proposed and final rules, thereby allowing the public to access regulatory
supporting materials and the comments of others from one web site. The
first agencies were placed on this government-wide docket in November

249. Id. at 10-11.
250. Id. at 16.
251. Risk assessment is defined as “a scientific and/or technical document that assembles
and synthesizes scientific information to determine whether a potential hazard exists and/or
the extent of possible risk to human health, safety, or the environment.” Id. at 23.
252. Id. at 21.
253. Id. at 1.
254. OMB oversees the e-rulemaking initiative, and it has named EPA as the lead agency
for the effort, replacing DOT. For a discussion of this initiative, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO-05-777, ELECTRONIC RULEMAKING: PROGRESS MADE IN DEVELOPING
CENTRALIZED E-RULEMAKING SYSTEM (2005) [hereinafter GAO, ELECTRONIC
RULEMAKING].
255. The
eRulemaking
Initiative,
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main (last visited May 9, 2006).
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2005, and other agencies are expected to move to the system during 2006
and 2007. 256 Although some analysts believe that a government-wide
electronic docket could improve the ability of the public to provide useful
rulemaking comments, others are less sanguine about the influence of such
a system:
A centralized docket would . . . dramatize and enhance OMB’s and
OIRA’s already central role. Together with information specialists at
EPA, they are the ones creating this new apparatus, and to have all
information travel through their gateway only adds to the possibilities of
their influence . . . . As agencies become more transparent, they become
more transparent to the President as well as to the public. It used to be
that the number of copies of materials in the docket was limited, and it
was physically located at the agency. Now the docket is immediately
available on equal and easy terms to all who want it, including the
President, and politics will give him the incentive to attend to it. 257

OIRA INITIATIVES AND PREVIOUS REFORM EFFORTS
Several of the OIRA initiatives since 2001 appear to be attempts to
accomplish administratively (through circulars, bulletins, guidance, reports,
and actions by OIRA desk officers) what regulatory reform advocates were
not able to accomplish legislatively during the previous decade. During the
mid-to-late 1990s, Congress considered a number of pieces of
comprehensive regulatory reform legislation, none of which was ultimately
enacted.258 For example, S. 746, considered by the 106th Congress in
1999, would have established detailed procedures for preparing cost-benefit
analyses and risk assessments, and for using them in the rulemaking
process. 259 The specific requirements in the bill for cost-benefit analysis
were generally similar to (although not as detailed as) those in OMB
Circular A-4, issued in 2003. The requirements for risk assessment in the
bill were generally similar to those in the proposed risk assessment bulletin
issued in 2006, although the bulletin will (if adopted) apply more broadly.
S. 746 would have also required agencies to provide for an independent
peer review of any required risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses of
256. GAO, ELECTRONIC RULEMAKING, supra note 254, at 19.
257. Richard G. Stoll & Katherine L. Lazarski, Rulemaking, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE, 2003-2004, at 160 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers
ed. 2004).
258. See Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, 106th Cong. (1999);
Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995); Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1997, S. 981, 105th Cong. (1997).
259. See Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, §§ 623, 624, 106th Congress
(1999), available at http://www.senate.gov/~govt-aff/s746.htm (last visited May 12, 2006).
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major rules that the agencies or OMB anticipated would have a $500
million impact on the economy. 260 OMB’s bulletin on peer review
contains many of the same requirements, but (like the risk assessment
bulletin) applies to more rules than the legislation would have if it had been
enacted.
Other recent initiatives are similarly reflective of previous legislative
reform efforts.
For example, OIRA’s interpretation of the
“recommendations for reform” provisions in the Regulatory Right-to-Know
Act resulted in broad-scale calls for the public to nominate existing
regulations for review and possible elimination or modification. 261 S. 343
in the 104th Congress would have also required a review of existing agency
rules, although the reviews contemplated in the legislation would have been
conducted by the agencies themselves, not the public, and were focused on
major rules. 262
OIRA AND THE FUTURE OF PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY REVIEW
For twenty-five years, OIRA has played a central role in the federal
rulemaking process. Although some argued early in OIRA’s history that
the office’s regulatory review role was unconstitutional, few observers
continue to hold that view. No court has directly addressed the
constitutionality of the OIRA regulatory review process, but in 1981 (the
year that OIRA was created) the D.C. Circuit said the following:
The court recognizes the basic need of the President and his White House
staff to monitor the consistency of agency regulations with Administration
policy. He and his advisors surely must be briefed fully and frequently
about rules in the making, and their contributions to policymaking
considered. The executive power under our Constitution, after all, is not
shared—it rests exclusively with the President. 263

OIRA is located within the Executive Office of the President and is the
President’s direct representative in the government-wide rulemaking
process. As Executive Order 12,866 states, OIRA is the “repository of
expertise on regulatory issues” within the executive branch, and is uniquely
positioned both within OMB (with its budgetary influence) and within the
federal rulemaking process (reviewing and commenting on rules just before
260. See id. at §§ 625.
261. See note 226 supra for a discussion of OMB’s calls for “recommendations for
reform.”
262. See S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, COMPREHENSIVE REGULATORY REFORM
ACT OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104-89 (1995) (noting that section 625 of the bill would have
required the review of existing rules).
263. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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they are published in the Federal Register) to enable it to exert maximum
influence. 264
Variations in how OIRA operates—as a gatekeeper or a counselor—are
largely a function of the wishes of the President that the office serves. For
example, in a June 2001 article in the Harvard Law Review, Elena Kagan
posited that, while it is generally acknowledged that President Reagan used
OIRA’s review function as a tool to control the policy and political agenda
in an anti-regulatory manner, President Clinton did much the same thing to
accomplish pro-regulatory objectives. 265 She argued that Clinton did so by
exercising directive authority and asserting personal ownership over a
range of agency actions, thereby making them “presidential” in nature. 266
She also characterized this emergence of enhanced methods of presidential
control over the regulatory state—what she termed the “presidentialization
of administration”—as “the most important development in the last two
decades in administrative process.” 267 Similarly, William F. West
concluded that OIRA’s regulatory review process “has promoted executive
interests across administrations precisely because the process has
internalized incumbents’ political preferences.” 268 Therefore, instead of
the “neutral competence” that some assert that bureaucracy can best
provide presidents, West characterizes OIRA’s performance as “responsive
competence.” 269
Other observers, however, view OIRA (like other executive branch
agencies) as having more of a shared allegiance between the President and
the Congress. 270 They point out that OIRA was created by Congress, and
has been given a number of statutory responsibilities through the PRA and
other laws. Nevertheless, even supporters of a strong legislative
perspective recognize that OIRA is part of the Executive Office of the
President, and that Congress gave OIRA its responsibilities because of its
strategic position within that office.271 With both statutory and executive
order responsibilities, OIRA embodies a broader tension between Congress

264. Executive Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, at 51,736.
265. Elana Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2248 (2001).
266. Id. at 2250.
267. Id. at 2383.
268. William F. West, The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review: Organizational
Stability and Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 76, 76 (2005).
269. Id. at 91.
270. See generally DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, 1946-1999 (2001)
271. Id. at 56 (“[W]here coordinated government-wide clearance is required to achieve
Congress’ policy objectives, there may be few or no alternatives (to paperwork and
regulatory review within OMB).”).

COPELAND_CHRISTENSEN

148

2/3/2011 10:22 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

and the President for control of administrative agencies.
Although major differences of opinion exist among observers of the
federal rulemaking process regarding the appropriateness of OIRA’s
regulatory review role, the broad reach and influence of the office is
undebatable. Rulemaking agencies formally challenge OIRA’s returns and
“suggestions” for change only rarely, and (as noted previously) sometimes
refrain from even submitting draft rules for review if they believe they will
be opposed by OIRA. Regulated entities also recognize OIRA’s influence,
and seem to view the office as a “court of second resort” if they are unable
to influence regulatory agencies to their position directly.
POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE ISSUES
Congress also recognizes the importance that OIRA plays in the
rulemaking process, and usually holds several hearings each year
examining OIRA’s implementation of its responsibilities pursuant to
various statutes and executive orders. Proposals for changes to OIRA’s
authority and responsibilities have focused on such issues as (1) providing
a statutory underpinning for regulatory reviews, (2) increasing or
decreasing the office’s funding and staffing, (3) including independent
agencies’ rules under the office’s regulatory review function, and (4)
improving the transparency of OIRA’s regulatory review processes.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR REGULATORY REVIEW
As noted previously, Congress has enacted legislation expanding
OIRA’s statutory responsibilities, and has considered (but not enacted)
legislation that would provide a statutory basis for OIRA’s regulatory
review function. For example, in the 106th Congress, S. 746 (the
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999) would have required the President,
via OMB and OIRA, to “establish a process for the review and
coordination of Federal agency regulatory actions.” 272 The proposed
legislation also would have codified many of the transparency requirements
in Executive Order 12,866.
Congress has also considered legislation that would affect OIRA as part
of broader OMB changes. For example, during the 107th Congress,
proposed legislation was introduced (but not enacted) that would have
established an Office of Management within the Executive Office of the
President and redesignated OMB as the Office of the Federal Budget.273

272. Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999, S. 746, 106th Cong. § 632 (1999).
273. See H.R. 616, 107th Cong. (2001).
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As part of that process, OIRA and other offices within OMB would have
been abolished and their functions and authorities transferred to the new
Office of Management.
FUNDING AND STAFFING
OIRA does not have a specific line item in the budget, so its funding is
part of OMB’s appropriation. Similarly, OIRA’s staffing levels are
allocated from OMB’s totals. Although OIRA staffing has increased in
recent years, OIRA still has fewer staff than it had when its regulatory
review function was first established in 1981. 274 Currently, about thirty
OIRA desk officers and branch chiefs review about 3,000 agency
information collection requests each year and about 700 significant rules
each year. 275 At various times in its history, certain members of Congress
have attempted to reduce funding for OIRA in order to signal congressional
displeasure with the office’s actions. 276 Other observers, however, believe
that OIRA’s funding should be increased, not reduced, arguing that a
relatively small amount of additional resources for OIRA could yield
substantial benefits. 277
At other times, proposed legislation has been introduced that designates
the manner in which OIRA staff should be used. For example, a provision
in H.R. 2432, as originally introduced, would have required the OMB
Director to “assign, at a minimum, the equivalent of at least two full time
staffers to review the Federal information collection burden on the public
imposed by the Internal Revenue Service.”278 The Internal Revenue
Service accounts for more than eighty percent of the estimated paperwork
burden, but OIRA indicated that it devoted less than one FTE to reviewing
the agency’s paperwork requests (because much of the burden is mandated
by statute). 279 The Bush Administration objected to this specific direction
274. GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 60.
275. Id. Although OIRA had fifty-five authorized full-time-equivalent positions in 2003,
many of those staff worked in the office’s non-regulatory branches (information policy and
technology, and statistical and science policy) or as administrative staff.
276. For example, as noted previously, in OMB’s appropriation for 2002, Congress
stipulated that nearly $1.6 million should not be obligated until OMB submitted a report
assessing the total costs and benefits of implementing Executive Order No. 13,166. See
note 222 supra and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HAHN & ROBERT E. LITAN, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR. FOR
REGULATORY STUDIES, POLICY MATTERS 03-34, WHY CONGRESS SHOULD INCREASE
FUNDING FOR OMB REVIEW OF REGULATIONS (2003).
278. Paperwork and Regulatory Improvements Act of 2004, H.R. 2432, 108th Cong. § 3
(2004).
279. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Natural Resources &
Regulatory Affairs, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of
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of OIRA staff, so the sponsors of the bill agreed to delete this requirement
before it was approved by the House of Representatives in May 2004.280
ADDITION OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES’ RULES
Several of the statutes that OIRA helps to administer include rules issued
by independent regulatory agencies (e.g., the PRA, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, the Congressional Review Act, and the Information Quality
Act). Also, several recent OIRA initiatives (e.g., the November 2005
bulletin on guidance practices and the January 2006 bulletin on risk
assessment) cover those agencies as well as cabinet departments.
However, the executive orders that have established regulatory review
within OIRA have always explicitly excluded rules issued by those
agencies. 281 Some observers have suggested that this limitation be lifted,
arguing that independent regulatory agencies issue regulations that have a
significant impact on the economy (about $230 billion per year according
to OIRA), but their rules often contain little quantitative information on
regulatory costs and benefits.282 Those opposed to this expansion in
OIRA’s duties point out that independent regulatory agencies were
established to be relatively independent of the President, and the inclusion
of their rules under OIRA’s authority would threaten the basic structure on
which they were founded. In response, proponents argue that independent
regulatory agencies’ rules are already reviewed for purposes such as
paperwork clearance and ensuring that data quality requirements are met,
so examining the substance of the rules is just an extension of those
reviews.
TRANSPARENCY OF REVIEWS
One consistent area of concern to some observers has been the lack of
transparency of the OIRA review process to the public. Notwithstanding
recent improvements, they argue that it is difficult for the public to know
John
D.
Graham,
OIRA
Administrator),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/testimony/graham041103.html (last visited May
12, 2006).
280. As reported, the bill required the OMB Director to identify actions that IRS could
take to reduce paperwork burden on small businesses.
281. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 74, § 2(b) (defining covered agencies
as those “other than those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as defined in
44 U.S.C. § 3502(10)”).
282. See, e.g., CTR. FOR REGULATORY EFFECTIVENESS, A BLUEPRINT FOR OMB REVIEW OF
INDEPENDENT AGENCY REGULATIONS (2002). The previously mentioned bill, S. 746, that
proposed to establish the presidential review of rules in law, would have included rules
issued by independent regulatory agencies.
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with any degree of certainty what changes OIRA has suggested to
agencies’ draft rules, what contacts OIRA has made with regulated entities
and other outside parties regarding those rules, or whether documents were
exchanged between OIRA and the agencies. In its September 2003 report,
GAO said that the documentation that agencies are required to provide
showing the changes made at OIRA’s suggestion or recommendation were
not always available and, when so provided, were not always clear or
consistent. 283 GAO also said that the transparency requirements incumbent
on OIRA were not always clear, and recommended several improvements.
For example:
• Although OIRA indicated that it can have its greatest impact on
agencies’ rules during informal reviews before review packages are
formally submitted, OIRA indicated that agencies only had to disclose the
changes made at OIRA’s suggestion during formal review (some of which
were as short as one day). GAO recommended that OIRA define this
requirement in the executive order to include informal reviews, just as it
did with regard to the requirements involving the office’s communications
with outside parties. 284
• As noted previously, the “consistent with change” code in OIRA’s
database does not differentiate between OIRA- or agency-initiated changes,
or changes that were major or minor in nature. GAO recommended that
the database be changed to more clearly indicate which rules were
substantively changed at OIRA’s suggestion. 285
• GAO also recommended refinements to the executive order’s
requirements applicable to OIRA (e.g., more clearly indicating on its web
site the regulatory actions being discussed at meetings with outside parties
and the affiliations of the participants) and the requirements applicable to
the agencies (e.g., defining the types of “substantive” changes that agencies
should disclose). 286
In commenting on GAO’s report, the Administrator of OIRA said that
the office planned to review its implementation of the executive order’s
transparency requirements and would work to improve the clarity of its
meeting log. 287 However, he also said he did not believe that changes
made during informal OIRA reviews should be disclosed—even though he
said that OIRA can have its greatest influence during informal reviews.288
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

GAO, RULEMAKING, supra note 6, at 85.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 214.
Id.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
John Graham was sworn in as OIRA Administrator in July 2001, making
him the ninth person to occupy that position since the office was created in
1981. 289 In October 2005, Graham announced that he would leave the
office in early 2006 and become dean of the Frederick S. Pardee Rand
Graduate School in Santa Monica, California.290 Although the Executive
Order governing the review process has not substantively changed since its
issuance in 1993, Graham made numerous changes in how the order was
implemented and, more generally, how the office operated, during his
nearly five years as OIRA Administrator. Under his leadership, OIRA has
become less of a reactive, “end of the pipeline” reviewer and more of an
activist, instigative organization than under any previous administrator.
Evidence of this activist philosophy can be found in virtually all of the
initiatives begun during Graham’s tenure in office, and even in the manner
that OIRA has interpreted certain provisions in law. For example, under
some previous administrators, OIRA would not have been likely to
interpret the “recommendations for reform” language in the Regulatory
Right-to-Know Act as a requirement for agencies to solicit the public’s
views regarding which regulations merited reconsideration.
Administrator Graham’s tenure at OIRA has been both criticized and
praised, sometimes by the same observers. The actions generating the most
criticism (particularly from those advocating stronger health, safety, and
environmental rules) have often involved the assertion of OIRA’s authority
over agency rules, either directly (e.g., through prompt and return letters
and the general reassertion of the office’s “gatekeeper” role) or indirectly
(e.g., through its recent bulletins on peer review, guidance documents, and
risk assessment). There is some evidence that OIRA has more recently
adopted a somewhat less confrontational (or at least less visibly
confrontational) approach in its relations with the agencies. As noted
previously, the number of OIRA return letters and prompt letters has
declined precipitously in recent years. As one observer in 2004 said, “after
three years both OMB and agencies have come to a sufficient level of
mutual understanding and accommodation that such blunt tools are only
needed in exceptional circumstances.” 291

289. Public
Citizen,
John
Graham
Nomination
Confirmed,
http://www.citizen.org/congress/regulations/graham.html (last visited May 12, 2006).
290. Press Release, The Frederick S. Pardee Rand Graduate School, OMB Regulatory
Affairs Head and Former Harvard Professor John Graham Announced as New PRGS Dean
(Oct. 18, 2005), available at http://www.prgs.edu/news/new_dean.1005.html (last visited
May 11, 2006).
291. James W. Conrad, Jr., Regulatory Policy, in DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
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The actions of Administrator Graham that have generated the most
widespread praise have been those designed to improve the transparency of
OIRA’s review process, particularly the posting of the agency’s meetings
with outside parties on its web site. Of particular note and praise from
virtually all observers was his decision to post a record of those meetings
on the OIRA site even if they occurred before the rule was formally
submitted to OIRA. In doing so, Graham implicitly recognized that
presidential review of rulemaking can occur before the formal OIRA
review process begins. On the other hand, as of early 2006, the changes
that Administrator Graham committed to make to these postings to clarify
the rules being discussed and the identities of the participants still had not
been made. The meeting log on OIRA’s web site still uses acronyms such
as “CAIR” and “NBP” to indicate the subject of the meeting, and the
affiliations of those attending the meetings (much less their clients) are still
not clear. Also, OIRA’s coding of the outcomes of its reviews in its
database is still unclear. A rule coded as “consistent with change” suggests
that OIRA’s review had an effect on the rule, when in fact the agency may
have simply submitted a new draft. OIRA’s database also does not
differentiate between a major change in the focus and effect of a rule, and a
change that merely affects a matter so slight as a punctuation mark
contained in the rule’s text.
Even more importantly, OIRA still discourages agencies from disclosing
changes made to their rules at OIRA’s suggestion during “informal
reviews”—the period when OIRA says it has its greatest influence on
agencies’ rules. Unless those changes are disclosed, any claims of OIRA
transparency will ring somewhat hollow. No one has advocated that all
informal discussions between the agencies and OIRA during the rule
development process be made public, even after the fact. But certainly
when agencies and OIRA are exchanging drafts of rules, and agencies are
making changes to those drafts at OIRA’s suggestion before formal
submission, agencies could be required to disclose those changes after the
rules have been published in the Federal Register. This is particularly
important in those instances when informal reviews go on for weeks or
months, but the period of formal review may be limited to one day.
Some might argue that even if these recommended improvements to
OIRA transparency are implemented, the effect of OIRA’s reviews on
agencies rules can be hidden in other ways. For example, even if agencies
or OIRA are required to disclose all of the changes made at the office’s
suggestion or recommendation, OIRA could simply channel its comments

LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 122 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers, ed. 2002).
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through other entities (e.g., other parts of OMB, other parts of the
Executive Office of the President, or even through other executive branch
agencies as part of the interagency review process). Nevertheless, because
it is clear that there is a lack of transparency in what OIRA itself calls the
most important part of the process, improvements in OIRA transparency
should not be dismissed simply because the office’s effects may be
disguised in other ways.
THE FUTURE
Although the effects of Administrator Graham’s initiatives on OIRA in
recent years are particularly notable, other OIRA administrators have also
had a major effect on how the office operates. In many ways, OIRA
usually assumes the personality of the administrator and, more indirectly,
of the President whom the administrator serves. The President’s nominee to
succeed Administrator Graham is likely to continue this pattern, putting his
or her stamp on the office while continuing the reforms that Graham
initiated (at least until then end of this President’s term). As noted
previously, OIRA is the President’s official agent in the rulemaking
process, and helps ensure that the President’s vision for agency rules is
realized. OIRA’s regulatory review role on behalf of the President, once
controversial, is now virtually unchallenged. However, OIRA is also a
creature of, and is funded by Congress, and therefore must answer to it
regarding the implementation of its statutory authority and during the
appropriations process. During the last few years, Congress has not
significantly challenged OIRA’s recent initiatives, or encouraged OIRA to
go further in terms of its transparency. Whether this trend will continue in
the future is, at this writing, unclear.

